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ABSTRACT 
 
A rhetoric of globalism compelled Americans during the World War II era to imagine a 
postwar peace that would depend on individual economic security and global economic 
interdependence. In a time of radical contingency, globalism emerged as an inventive alternative 
both to the predominant isolationism that preceded the war and to the Cold War logic that would 
soon replace it. The project has discursive resonances in our current era of economic 
globalization, perpetual warfare, and domestic and global income inequality; by contextualizing 
globalism within America’s recent and founding history, and by focusing on the economic 
aspects of American identity within a globalizing world in a liminal moment, it also offers to the 
field of rhetorical studies an alternative account of popular, presidential, and institutional 
discourses in the World War II era.  
The study takes as its sites of analysis three rhetorical landmarks in the American history 
of globalization: Wendell Willkie’s One World (1943), President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State 
of the Union address, which concluded with an “Economic Bill of Rights” (1944), and the U.S. 
Congressional debates about the Bretton Woods institutions (1945). Willkie, the failed 1940 
Republican presidential candidate, traveled the globe and sometimes served as the President’s 
proxy, using ethos and presence to encourage Americans to imagine a postwar world that was 
small and familiar. Roosevelt, via the Economic Bill of Rights, managed Americans’ fears by 
inscribing economic security as a constitutional and universal right, drawing on the language of 
the nation’s founding and thus positioning the historical moment as one of kairos of the highest 
order. Congressional supporters and opponents of the Bretton Woods institutions, too, drew on 
the nation’s history to understand the present moment as radically contingent, using a 
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constitutive rhetoric of economics to institutionalize globalism. Although globalism was quickly 
overshadowed by the events of the early Cold War, it remains a rhetorical resource in discussions 
about American identity as it intersects with the global implications of late capitalism.      
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Historians often note that the post-World War II era was a remarkable episode in world 
politics and economics, what John Ikenberry calls an “ordering moment” in which the global 
dynamics of power shifted.1 The narrative we most usually hear is that the United States, 
counterbalanced in a modernist bipolar world by Soviet Russia, rose after the war to dominate 
and lead as a liberal hegemon for the next half century, and that the end of the Cold War brought 
a new era of globalization characterized by national security through international economic 
cooperation. Although scholars of the Cold War variously mark its origins and rhetorical 
trajectories, it is certain that the world changed course when Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office 
in April 1945, the atomic bombs were dropped in August 1945, Churchill gave his “Iron 
Curtain” speech in 1946, and Harry S. Truman launched the Truman Doctrine in 1947—which 
began the policy of Soviet containment and, as one observer states, “helped to enshrine in 
American popular culture the conviction that the world is a fundamentally dangerous place.”2  
However, starting roughly in 1940 with debates about Lend-Lease and throughout World 
War II, a different vision of the future was taking hold of the American imagination, one of 
peace through global economic cooperation. It is this brief, overlooked era of global optimism, 
or what I refer to as globalism, that this dissertation project takes up.  
Globalism was popular in the postwar planning era. One of its chief and vocal proponents 
was businessman and failed 1940 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie, whose 
October 1942 radio address following a famous trip around the world was heard by 36,200,000 
listeners—second only to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Pearl Harbor address.3 Willkie’s 
book One World shattered publication records upon initial release in April 1943, with Simon & 
Schuster running four sets of print plates around the clock to keep up with sales averaging 
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50,000 per day.4 Serialized versions of the book circulated in newspapers and magazines across 
the country, and around the world, reaching hundreds of thousands of readers. So popular and 
charismatic was Willkie that after the 1940 election President Roosevelt asked him to travel as a 
personal representative to London in order to boost American public support for Lend-Lease. 
The two maintained a friendship despite a history of bitter political rivalry, Willkie uniquely able 
to trumpet globalism in ways that Roosevelt, physically and rhetorically constrained, could not.  
Meanwhile, shortly after the Pearl Harbor bombings in December 1941, the Roosevelt 
administration began making plans for international currency stabilization, fearing a global 
return to the Great Depression.5 Harry Dexter White, Assistant to Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau, became the American responsible for negotiating the terms of what would become 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD, more commonly known as the World Bank). White and British economist 
John Maynard Keynes led the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire, and, 
however faulty or failingly, the discourse of global international economic cooperation began to 
take institutional form.  
On July 13, 1944, a few weeks after D-Day, as delegates from around the world were 
meeting in the cool mountains of New Hampshire, and as U.S. forces prepared for battle in 
Guam, President Roosevelt wrote to Willkie as he embarked on a campaign trip: “I want to see 
you when I come back… I want to talk with you about the future, even the somewhat distant 
future, and in regard to the foreign relations problems of the immediate future.”6 That meeting 
never came to pass. Willkie replied a week later in a humble letter saying that they should wait 
until after the November election, “because you in a great way and I in a small one have the trust 
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and confidence of people who might see in the most innocent meeting between us at the time, 
some betrayal of the principles which we each respectively hold so deeply.”7  
By early October that year, Willkie was dead. Roosevelt, re-elected for a fourth term, 
passed away six months later in his cottage at Warm Springs, GA in April, 1945. Congress 
approved the Bretton Woods agreements a few weeks after Roosevelt’s death, just as the first 
atomic bomb was being tested in Alamogordo, NM. The rest, as they say, is history. 
Examining globalism as a popular discourse and deeply held principle in the postwar 
planning era, this project studies how Americans during the war imagined a future that might 
have been otherwise. Broadly, I want to know why, from a perspective that considers rhetoric’s 
instrumental and constitutive effects, the globalism of this era was so dramatically eclipsed. 
Particularly, I ask how the postwar world economy was imagined by the American public, 
facilitated by the Roosevelt presidency, and institutionalized in the Bretton Woods agreements. 
By addressing these questions, I offer the field of rhetorical studies a way to understand the era 
as liminal or radically contingent; at the same time, I offer to other communities of researchers 
rhetoric as a methodological intervention that describes the features of globalism and thinks 
about how American identity was performed in public discourse during the era. A rhetorical 
approach allows us to direct “attention to roads not taken,” which for David Zarefsky is a 
valuable reason to study history.8 This approach involves paying attention to the arguments used 
to position Americans within a certain postwar worldview, as well as the language used to 
articulate an institutional framework for that view.  
As a method, rhetoric lends insight into the role of public, presidential, and institutional 
discourses in shaping, reflecting, and constituting American attitudes toward domestic and 
international economics. For oikos, the Greek root of the word economics, starts with the 
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household, and thus what is up for debate during this and every period of historical transition is 
nothing less than how we will live our everyday lives. As one historian has written about the era, 
“times of extraordinary strain break down…comfortable barriers between the personal and the 
political, the domestic and the international.”9 The study of rhetoric, of “the politically 
consequential process of public argumentation,” as M. Lane Bruner defines it, offers a lens 
through which to view the complex, contested, and often conflicting relationships between 
American and worldwide political and economic interests.10 Moreover, as James Arnt Aune 
argued, rhetoricians must “promote more widespread understanding of the strategic and agonistic 
dimensions of public debate over the economy.”11  
Looking at globalism over a set of textual landmarks from the postwar planning era, I 
argue that a discourse of globalism offered to the American public a sense of hope about the 
future against the backdrop of war, fear, and profound uncertainty. Although the same might be 
said about liberal internationalism as a political and foreign policy doctrine during the era, I am 
especially interested in the economic aspect of this discourse as a way of making sense out of 
chaos, a way for Americans to imagine themselves, their daily lives, in the postwar world. As my 
analysis in this dissertation will show, globalism provided a set of topoi, with key terms and lines 
of argument that cohered together as a vocabulary. By examining landmark moments in the 
mobilization of that vocabulary, I will not only show how it served as an important and 
influential inventional resource in the World War II era, but point to ways it continues to linger 
in the public imagination today.   
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Globalism as Constitutive Rhetoric 
I use the concept of globalism to denote an optimistic vision of peace through free trade 
and to name a discourse that was compelling for Americans during the war and postwar planning 
era. Variously touted or cleverly dismissed at the time as “globaloney,” the rhetoric embodied by 
Willkie and others was nevertheless powerful.12 An economics that promoted trade 
liberalization, especially, became commonplaces in both American public discourse during the 
era and in the debates surrounding Bretton Woods. In fact, as Barry Eichengreen states, “there 
was more enthusiasm in the Congress for the trade-promoting thrust of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement than for its abstruse monetary provisions; without the emphasis placed on the former 
in the Articles of Agreement, it is unlikely that the Congress would have agreed to ratification.”13 
As an ideological and rhetorical resource, the doctrine of free trade had a long precedent, tracing 
a least back to ancient Greece and Rome; most basically, described by Douglas Irwin, free trade 
doctrine is a belief system in which the universal brotherhood of mankind will benefit from a 
global division of labor in which a region or nation uses its natural resources and human 
capabilities as efficiently as possible in order to create as much income as possible.14 The idea of 
a universal economy, beyond the bounds of nation-states, underlies the discourse of free trade 
perhaps because of its logical simplicity, the assumption being that the world shall evolve 
naturally according to God’s will. 
In addition to free trade doctrine, Wilsonianism comprised a second major influence in 
the discourse of globalism in the World War II era. While isolationism was predominant in 
public discourse throughout the 1930s as the focus was on domestic policy during the 
Depression, a handful of elite, wealthy Americans in the northeast and in cosmopolitan cities 
such as San Francisco attempted to keep President Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War I 
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internationalism alive by forming advocacy and educational groups.15 As Europe descended into 
war in the late 1930s, these Americans managed to make the argument that the war was a result 
of the League’s failure, and by the middle of 1944 some 70% of Americans favored a new 
international organization; the renewed internationalism of WWII resulted in what Robert Divine 
calls a “Wilson revival” that even took the form of an August 1944 film entitled Wilson.16 
President Roosevelt used Wilsonian rhetoric throughout his presidency, moving between 
internationalism and isolationism in careful ways. He built a rhetorical program around what 
Mary Stuckey has called a “good neighbor” stance, using echoes of Wilsonianism to position 
Americans and the United States within a globalized world.17 
Although the vocabulary of what we in the twenty-first century know as globalization 
was not available during World War II and the postwar planning era, we see it beginning to 
emerge in public, presidential, and institutional discourses as a forward-looking response to the 
ravages of war. Globalism offered Americans an economic perspective with which to understand 
the future during an epochal moment of radical contingency, for liminality prompts rhetorical 
invention and public deliberation. Dilip Gaonkar, explaining Aristotle’s contingency thesis, 
states that “if human beings can act in more than one way… then it makes sense to deliberate and 
choose. Rhetoric is the discursive medium of deliberating and choosing, especially in the public 
sphere.”18 Similarly, Thomas Farrell, also drawing on Aristotle, highlights the relationship 
between rhetoric, contingency, and historical change: “Grasped in unfolding episodes, shared by 
implicated audiences, rhetoric may—through its various affiliative inferences and dissociative 
devices—provide definition, impetus, and direction to history in the making, even if we wait 
impatiently for the heroes and villains to be named later.”19  
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This dissertation project intends neither to heroize nor vilify the cast of characters 
associated with the rhetoric of globalism in the war and postwar planning era, but it does seek to 
shine a spotlight on globalism and economic discourse as constitutive resources during a moment 
of contingency. Both Farrell and Gaonkar explain that contingency is not simply uncertainty; it 
rather has to do with argumentative proof: “The contingent is neither something that is 
necessarily the case nor something that could never be the case. Rather, it is something which 
sometimes is and sometimes is not the case.”20 Setting aside instrumental questions about 
whether the globalism of the era failed or succeeded, then, or whether it represented utopian 
idealism or sound policy, a central goal of this project is to observe how a discourse—as debated 
and deliberated in public, presidential, and institutional realms—offered a constitutive vision of 
the postwar world. In this case, globalism had what James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca might 
call “generative potential” as a discourse that allowed Americans to imagine themselves within a 
postwar world of international economic cooperation and interdependence.21 
Moreover, globalism in the postwar planning era is an overlooked yet important story that 
has contemporary reverberations in our current era of war, global economic crisis, and U.S. 
income inequality. Whereas the narrative of postwar international economic cooperation and 
integration is often overshadowed by the dramatic bipolarity of the Cold War, historian David 
Kennedy challenges readers to think in the reverse: “And who could deny that globalization—the 
explosion in world trade, investment, and cultural mingling—was the signature and lasting 
international achievement of the postwar era, one likely to overshadow the Cold War in its long-
term historical consequences?”22  
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Literature Review 
Researchers interested in the politics and economics of the era tend to privilege an 
instrumentalist perspective that, while useful in contributing to the historical record, can be 
somewhat limiting; instead, a rhetorical approach allows us to think about globalism in the era as 
a discourse whose effects were both instrumental and constitutive. Further, it is also worthwhile 
for researchers in rhetorical studies, especially those interested in our current era of 
globalization, to consider this overlooked historical moment for its own sake.  
 
Political and Economic Accounts of the Postwar Planning Era 
Even though Congress passed the Bretton Woods agreements, the institutions largely 
failed, or at least failed to support the vision of long-term peace through economic cooperation 
that Willkie trumpeted, Roosevelt facilitated, and their architects performed. A Russian 
delegation was present at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, but it was there only effectively 
to pay lip service to the process; Russia did not actually join the IMF until 1992, after the end of 
the Cold War.23 After the end of World War II, it soon became clear that the Bank was not 
equipped to handle reconstruction of Europe and its economy, and instead the Marshall Plan 
began to take shape around the same time as the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Keynes died by 
sudden heart attack in April 1946, disillusioned and regretful of the entire Bretton Woods 
project.24 White suffered a similar fate in August 1948, two days after his appearance before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee in which he defended himself against accusations that 
he was a Soviet spy. The third pillar of Bretton Woods, an International Trade Organization 
(ITO), was never brought into being; a watered down version of it—the Global Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—was ratified in 1947.  
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From there, the Bretton Woods institutions took on lives of their own. In 1994, GATT 
became what is now known as the World Trade Organization (WTO); in the interim, the IMF 
and World Bank, for better or worse—usually the latter—became major influences in the 
economies of the developing world. For example, in a damning critique of the World Bank and 
IMF’s policies of lending money with strings attached, formally called Structural Adjustment, 
Catherine Caufield informs readers that by the mid-1970s, when the Bretton Woods system 
officially collapsed and the gold standard was abandoned, most of the money being lent to Latin 
America was going to prevent defaults on previous loans.25 Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and 
its Discontents likewise offers a famously scathing appraisal of the IMF’s “one size fits all” 
austerity measures that actually hindered the growth of the same economies that they purported 
to help.26 Thus, by the end of the Cold War and turn of the millennium, the World Bank, IMF, 
and WTO even more so came to symbolize for many observers an outdated, antidemocratic face 
of bureaucratic evil in a new age of globalization, giving way to some of the largest protests seen 
since the Vietnam war.27 For this set of activists and globalization scholars, the stakes of the 
Bretton Woods institutions are extremely high and remain an abiding problem.28  
For other scholars of globalization and political economy, however, the original Bretton 
Woods institutions were not all that important. John Lewis Gaddis observes that Roosevelt 
simply “failed to build the popular consensus behind his program which would ensure its 
implementation,” and as a result the politics of the Cold War—rather than the economics of 
international cooperation—became the ordering logic of the day.29 John Gerard Ruggie argues 
that American hegemony encoded in international institutions as “embedded liberalism” was the 
underlying grammar of international relations in the decades after WWII even if the institutions 
were flawed.30 Specifically on the failure of the ITO, which would have been the capstone 
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institution of the Bretton Woods triad once currency was stabilized (IMF) and postwar national 
economies were beginning to rebuild (IBRD), Douglas Irwin’s suggestion is simply that 
although free trade sounds good in theory, it does not work in practice.31 Drawing on Ruggie and 
offering more explanation than Irwin, Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilalo locate a tension between 
trade liberalization and protecting the modern liberal democratic welfare state, citing it as the 
reason why the ITO was never viable.32 Alternatively, Jeffry A. Frieden argues that trade 
liberalization flourished despite the lack of an ITO,33 while Eichengreen argues that 
liberalization did not happen quickly enough and that for all their good intentions, the Bretton 
Woods institutions could not stand up to the political challenges of the postwar world. 
In sum, there is agreement that the Bretton Woods institutions failed to perform both the 
ideological and practical work of globalism and global economic integration in the way that 
Roosevelt imagined and Willkie popularized. There is also agreement that this historical moment 
was epochal, that the world was poised to go in one direction but went instead in another. While 
many researchers offer various political and economic explanations that account for this 
directional change, by suggesting for example that the policies themselves were too weak to 
handle the economy or too grandiose to implement, my project offers an additional dimension. 
By looking systematically at rhetorical and cultural factors that these other explanations tend not 
to account for, I show how in the face of uncertainty and indeterminacy, globalism—and 
particularly the rhetoric of free trade—provided a palpable way to understand the postwar world.   
 
Historical Accounts of the Postwar Planning Era 
Historians of the era have offered several rich archival studies that take into consideration 
intersecting cultural, intellectual, and political forces at play during the transformative moment in 
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which global power became the new American identity. In a history of the 1940 election, Susan 
Dunn provides an account of the isolationist/internationalist political divide before the war, 
explaining that Roosevelt and Willkie were in close agreement on a postwar vision of global 
human rights through free trade--yet Willkie, unlike Roosevelt, was “free to speak out as a moral 
leader.”34 Charles Peters has likewise written a journalistic account of how Willkie’s idealism 
triumphed even if it did not win him the presidency.35 Liberal internationalism only gained more 
traction among the public as the war unfolded, and for Robert Dallek the 1944 election hinged on 
Roosevelt’s ability to court these voters.36 Likewise, H.W. Brands details how Roosevelt crafted 
the politics of the 1944 election such that it became a “referendum on his internationalist 
vision.”37 Indeed, much ink has been spilled over Roosevelt in the war era and the legacy that he 
wanted to leave.38 
 Less has been said, however, about how Roosevelt’s internationalist economic vision 
was or was not translated into policy at the time, or how it continues to resonate in our own time. 
Histories of the early Cold War indicate that although he was chiefly responsible for establishing 
careful diplomatic relationships, particularly with Stalin, and that he was committed to the 
principles of the postwar planners, Roosevelt himself was not involved in the details. Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull long championed lowering trade barriers as a foreign policy approach,39 
and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau was hopeful that a peacetime economic agreement 
could be reached even with Russia, whose cooperation with the United States during the war was 
carefully managed via Lend-Lease.40 Ultimately, a turf battle between the State and Treasury 
departments was won by Morgenthau, who had the president’s ear, and Morgenthau appointed 
technocrat Harry Dexter White to spearhead what would become the Bretton Woods 
negotiations. In a comprehensive book about Bretton Woods, Benn Steil places the debates 
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between White and Keynes as central to our understanding of the era, one he also sees of epic 
upheaval, and argues that White’s imagination and savvy would determine the fate of the 
postwar world economy.41  
Although Steil and the other historians of the era spin readable tales, filled with 
espionage, sex secrets, tense diplomacy, and requisite political squabbling, they tend not to 
address the underlying questions about how and why the globalist vision would so quickly 
evaporate. Elizabeth Borgwardt gets closer to this question in her examination of the 1941-1945 
period by looking at how what she calls “transitional regimes,” including the Bretton Woods 
institutions, that were embodied in Roosevelt’s (and White’s) vision of a “New Deal for the 
world.” Borgwardt sees a productive tension in how “these multilateral institutions bridged the 
gap between facts and norms, that is, between the horrifying realities of wartime devastation and 
such aspirational abstractions as ‘justice’ and ‘security.’”42 Borgwardt explicitly wants to reveal 
a mismatch between what she calls rhetoric versus reality, but this approach tends to reduce 
rhetoric to the sweeping, “aspirational abstractions” put forth by Roosevelt that were, in her 
rendering, divorced from reality.  
While researchers of this historical moment ask similar questions as I do about the nature 
of American identity in an interdependent postwar world, then, and while they make perceptive 
claims about Roosevelt’s rhetoric, I extend the scope of their inquiry. By detailing the rhetorical 
features of landmark texts from the era, the dissertation offers an understanding of globalism as 
both constitutive of American identity and performed through the international economic 
architecture of the IMF and IBRD.  
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Rhetorical Studies and the Postwar Planning Era 
For researchers in the field of rhetoric, the dissertation contributes an examination of an 
era that was radically contingent and thus ripe for what we call invention, or the discovery of 
argumentative resources, during a generative moment in which collective identity is threatened. 
During a time of crisis, a rhetoric of globalism emerged as a compelling way for Americans to 
imagine long-term peace, national security, and household prosperity. Perhaps because such 
rhetoric was instrumentally realized only provisionally or failingly via the Bretton Woods 
institutions, it tends to be neglected by scholars of political economy and historians of the era. A 
rhetorical approach, however, moves beyond instrumentalist questions by paying attention 
instead to alternative narratives—“roads not taken”—and reveals globalism’s broader 
constitutive effects. By examining the discourse of globalism in the postwar planning era through 
a series of landmarks along those proverbial roads, the dissertation shows how appeals for peace 
and prosperity through free trade and economic rhetoric have historically been, and still remain, 
an important aspect of American self-understanding—especially in times of global crisis.  
Rhetoric scholars have written about American rhetoric and public discourse in wartime 
by considering, for example, public debate about Japan as well as Truman’s decision to drop the 
bomb, genres of writing that women scientists used in the development of war technology, and 
how Kenneth Burke’s major contributions were informed by the war.43 These studies are useful 
because they present important aspects of American discourse about the war while it was 
ongoing, and they understand war as a significant exigence; I share their purposes to the extent 
that I am examining globalism as yet another aspect of that discourse. Moreover, the idea of 
radical contingency and the roles of rhetoric and public discourse in the shift away from 
globalism, at the war’s end, into an age of nuclear domination very much motivate rhetorical 
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scholarship about the early Cold War,44 and one of my aims in this project is to bring questions 
about free trade and global economic interdependency into that discussion.  
A sense of liminality—or deep uncertainty about the future and about how people, and 
nations for that matter, shall go about the business of living their day-to-day lives—underlies 
much of the scholarship and thinking in and about the era. Robert Skidelsky argues that John 
Maynard Keynes was obsessed not only with mathematical uncertainty and probability, but also 
with how the whole of economic discourse animates human life: “Taking uncertainty seriously… 
has profound implications not just for how one does economics and how one applies it, but for 
one’s understanding of practically all aspects of human activity. It helps explain the rules and 
conventions by which people live.”45 As a significant part of public discourse in the war and 
postwar planning era, globalism offered Americans a measure of rationality and predictability.  
In examining the role of Wendell Willkie as a popular centrist who promoted a sense of 
postwar global optimism among the American public, as well as how the Bretton Woods 
agreements were debated in Congress, this project also enriches scholarship in the field of 
rhetorical studies of the presidency. As David Zarefsky has argued, presidents are uniquely 
positioned to shape public understanding of proposals and worldviews, and, as he states 
unequivocally, “presidential rhetoric defines political reality.”46 Indeed, Zarefsky notes, 
Roosevelt’s rhetoric completely re-defined liberalism. By extending the scope of the analysis to 
Willkie as a presidential surrogate, and Congress as a site of deliberation, I illustrate how others 
contribute to and institutionalize presidential goals and aims.  
Zarefsky responds to a vein of social and political science whose impulse it is to measure 
rhetorical effects quantitatively. Other scholars—as a reply to the poststructuralist turn in the 
humanities, which invites us to think about how language shapes culture and challenges the 
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notion that the intended message of a single author, or rhetor, can be deemed successful or 
unsuccessful—have similarly offered an expansive rendering of what a rhetorical transaction 
might include. Maurice Charland’s important 1987 Quarterly Journal of Speech article provides 
a case study in constitutive rhetoric’s capacity to shape and perform collective understandings of 
identity. Charland brought Louis Althusser’s notion of interpellation to bear on the field of 
rhetorical studies by putting it into conversation with Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification, in 
which the audience participates in the creation of rhetorical discourse, arguing that subjects are 
brought into being, or constituted, discursively.47 Using the example of Québécois separatism in 
the late 1960’s, Charland argues that even though an attempt by French-speaking residents of 
Quebec to establish a national sovereignty instrumentally failed, it had the powerful constitutive 
effect of facilitating a collective self-understanding among this population as Québécois.  
James Jasinski extends Charland’s notion of the constitutive by identifying four 
“dimensions of discursive practice” that often interact with one another, emphasizing not only 
subjectivity and individual and collective identity but also the experience of time and space, 
political and communal culture, and the linguistic resources that inform conceptual change as 
observed in historically situated discourse.48 By focusing on the concept of globalism through 
preserving what Jasinski calls “attention to textual dynamics” 49 across three historical 
landmarks, my project uses a similar understanding of rhetorical inquiry as a method to consider 
the instrumental and constitutive implications of economic discourse in the constitution of 
American identity at a time of grave uncertainty, arguing that it offered a set of values, norms, 
and argumentative strategies for audiences to consider—and with which to understand 
themselves—in a time of radical liminality.  
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Another useful example of scholarship in our field that uses constitutive rhetoric to 
understand culture and identity is Vanessa Beasley’s You, the People, which studies 
longitudinally Americans’ shared beliefs about civic life and how they have been leveraged and 
constructed through presidential speeches. Beasley also anticipates the criticism of ascribing too 
much agency/intent to the institution of the presidency or to individual presidents themselves; 
she acknowledges that language is ephemeral and meaning is created not only by structures and 
individuals, but also by symbolic forces and previous rhetorical patterns and resources, what she 
calls an “ancient map.”  Like Charland, Beasley encourages rhetorical scholars to widen the 
scope of the texts, artifacts, time frames, and discourses that we choose as objects of study so as 
to accommodate more theoretical complexity.50  
Jasinski, although not explicitly conceptualizing constitutive rhetoric vis-à-vis 
poststructuralism in the same way as Charland and Beasley do, elsewhere puts forward the idea 
of performative traditions in order to move away from the instrumentalist paradigm characteristic 
of scholarship in the field that assumes a fixed situation in which the rhetor’s message is 
delivered to its intended audience. Much like Beasley’s ancient map, Jasinski defines invention 
as “a social process in that the words employed by any author are always already part of a 
performative tradition in which the author is situated and from which the author draws.”51 
Jasinski and Jennifer Merceica also take on the question of instrumentalist and constitutive 
effects by noting that the relationship need not be binary; instead, they use a process of 
distinguishing between textual “interiors” and “exteriors” to make interpretive claims about, for 
example, the narrative inner workings of a given text and at the same time emphasize how that 
text, situated within a set of intersecting discourses, might work over time and space to shape 
social reality and communal values.52 Performative traditions such as free trade doctrine and 
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Wilsonianism provide rhetorical openings for a discussion about not whether globalism failed or 
succeeded but where it came from, why it was persuasive, and how it worked on the American 
imagination.  
Scholars interested in rhetoric’s constitutive qualities have accounted specifically for the 
Roosevelt presidency as well as the Cold War. In a study that takes as its focus Roosevelt’s first 
inaugural, Davis W. Houck suggests that Roosevelt invited the public to remake its identity and 
communal attitude, and that it did so.53 In fact, Thomas Farrell claims that Roosevelt was 
“perhaps the most proficient constitutive rhetorician in America in the last century,” for he 
brought audiences in as co-participants and co-creators of a collective narrative.54 John M. 
Murphy uses Roosevelt’s foreign policy speeches to show how Roosevelt’s rhetoric moved the 
prevailing attitude of Americans from isolationism toward internationalism in order to garner 
support for what would inevitably become a world war.55 Looking at Roosevelt’s presidency in 
its entirety, Mary E. Stuckey concludes that Roosevelt’s postwar vision of global peace, led by 
“American example,” and “characterized by [Roosevelt] as a global neighborhood, was one of 
equality among states, noninterference in domestic matters, free and open trade, and peace 
through democratic capitalism.”56 Of course, as Denise M. Bostdorff suggests in her analysis of 
the Truman Doctrine, the international institutions that Roosevelt wanted to establish as his 
postwar legacy became overshadowed as the Cold War began to take shape under Truman.57 My 
project converses with these scholars by looking closely at the final years of the Roosevelt 
presidency, extending Stuckey’s apt metaphor of the “global neighborhood” by considering the 
narrative of globalism as a rhetorical alternative to the Cold War.  
Finally, this project answers a call in the field for scholars to pay more attention to 
rhetorics of economics, including free trade and globalization, and it does so by including 
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economics in the rhetorical construction of American identity during a contingent moment in 
which, as Jayson Harsin argues, “a major cultural shift was in fact underway.”58 Part of the 
reason why the Bretton Woods institutions failed, or at any rate failed to perform the function of 
ensuring world peace through the spirit of liberal international economic cooperation that Willkie 
so breathlessly advocated on Roosevelt’s behalf, might simply be because of the vast gulf of 
misunderstanding between the American public and the economists tasked with inventing the 
Bretton Woods institutions. As John Kenneth Galbraith notes, “so far from seeking 
communication with the world at large, the tendency of economics is to divorce itself therefrom 
and construct an unreal universe of its own.”59 In the 1980s as part of the rhetoric of inquiry 
movement, D. N. McCloskey, a trained economist, was the first to use rhetorical analysis to 
address this infamous incomprehensibility of economic discourse by looking, for example, at 
how economists use rhetorical devices such as metaphors. Many other scholars have since built 
upon McCloskey’s work; in our field, for instance, Houck has examined Keynes’s public letters 
to FDR during the Depression, demonstrating how Keynes built his argument for economic 
recovery through a scientism that cloaked a more progressive agenda, combined with a shrewd 
political sense of the steps Roosevelt would need to take so that the American public would 
support this agenda.60  
Closer to this project’s purposes in elucidating how globalism influenced the American 
imagination of the postwar economic world, James Kimble’s Mobilizing the Home Front looks at 
how war propaganda offered a constitutive vision of postwar citizenship.61 While a Keynesian 
approach to war funding would have included forced savings and involuntary taxes, Kimble 
argues that the Roosevelt administration, and particularly Morgenthau as head of the U.S. 
Treasury, embarked instead on a massive war bond campaign that served as propaganda for the 
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U.S. public, encouraging them to both literally and figuratively buy into the war effort. Whereas 
Kimble’s methods differ from mine in that he uses artifacts such as posters to show how rhetoric 
worked to constitute and reconstitute the American public during the war and at its end, both 
projects understand the era as a time of liminal crisis in which rhetoric influenced Americans 
would understand themselves during and after the war.62  
However, rhetorics of economics during the post-WWII planning era, of which Keynes 
and Keynesiansim are part and parcel, still remain under-studied. Aune argued in his Selling the 
Free Market that McCloskey-style scholarship “has reached a conceptual dead end,” and that 
rhetorical scholars should attend to the broader ways in which economics are debated in public 
discourse.63 One example of such scholarship from which I am taking a cue is Robert Asen’s 
Invoking the Invisible Hand, which uses Congressional debates about Social Security to show 
how what he calls “market talk” has constitutive power.64 Indeed, a longstanding relationship 
between rhetoric and economics, especially as it is embodied in and influenced by Adam Smith’s 
work, has not gone unnoticed in the field.65 Questions surrounding rhetorics of economics have 
also sparked a complex philosophical debate about the hermeneutic value of Marxism.66 Ron 
Greene is interested in using rhetoric to build social movements that oppose existing power 
structures; Dana Cloud, meanwhile, beckons rhetoricians to see foremost through the lens of 
social class.67 Each of these scholars is fundamentally invested in rhetoric’s democratic potential, 
as well as its implications for public policy and, in turn, material consequences.68 Situated thusly, 
the dissertation as a rhetorical study of the postwar planning era will allow us to look differently 
at the same questions about American identity and economic security against the backdrops of 
globalization and war that continue to bewilder us to this day.69  
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Chapters and Methods 
This project asks how a constitutive rhetoric of globalism was invented during a 
historical era of contingency, deliberated in public and presidential discourse, and instrumentally 
realized via a performative government act. In order to examine globalism in American public 
discourse during the postwar planning era, I turn to three principal texts: Wendell Willkie’s One 
World (1943), Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Economic Bill of Rights,” the conclusion to a State of 
the Union speech (1944), and the debates in the U.S. Congress about the Bretton Woods 
agreements (1945).  Together these case studies comprise a set of significant landmarks in the 
history of globalism during the era, landmarks that are overlooked and overshadowed in much of 
the scholarship about rhetoric during and immediately after the war. Analysis of the textual 
interiors and argumentative features of a book, a presidential speech, and a set of policy 
arguments reveals an alternative and lesser-known historical route to postwar life, one in which 
Americans imagined themselves not as capitalist warriors but as participants in an interdependent 
global economy.  
As noted above, Willkie’s popularization of globalism was unique; from his position as a 
private citizen and political centrist, he was able challenge existing notions of liberalism and 
garner widespread interest in, and support for, what amounts to a global peace and human rights 
agenda based on free trade. In 1942, Willkie made a trip around the globe, which resulted in the 
aforementioned bestselling book, a series of articles serialized in newspapers and popular 
magazines including Reader’s Digest, the New York Times Magazine, the Saturday Evening 
Post, and LOOK, and numerous radio addresses and dramatizations.70 Willkie’s optimism about 
lasting world peace through economic cooperation challenged how the American public thought 
about the war and, more importantly, how peace would be secured and maintained when the 
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fighting was over. It used ethos, presence, and the compression of time and space to challenge 
the predominant vocabulary of isolationism in American public discourse and provide an 
understanding of the globe in terms of rhetorical magnitude.  
In Chapter Two, I use an April 1943 Simon & Schuster first edition (second printing) of 
Willkie’s One World as a central text to illustrate how the argument for postwar globalism was 
made in popular public discourse. Willkie’s optimism took form in the metaphors, quips, and 
character sketches found throughout the book’s pages. He opens with the statement that the 
world is small, and he explains how they are just like us, that “our thinking in the future must be 
world-wide.”71 This landmark text has echoes in later popular liberal-centrist notions of 
globalism and neoliberal globalization, particularly as related to free trade rhetoric. Reading the 
story of Willkie’s global tour in One World, Americans were brought into a sense of optimism 
about a future that, at the time, was otherwise bleak. 
Accessing materials from the Willkie archive housed at the Lilly Library at Indiana 
University, Bloomington, I also examine the book’s production by looking at Willkie’s trip files 
and correspondence, demonstrating some of the complexities behind the happy veneer of global 
optimism. Willkie’s trip was both formally and informally supported by the Roosevelt 
administration, for example; I also thus examine the relationship between the President—and 
presidency—and Willkie—private citizen, failed Republican presidential candidate—in terms of 
their political and rhetorical opportunities and constraints in arguing for a vision of global peace 
through international economic cooperation.  
 Willkie was not authorized to articulate a collective national identity, and nor was he in a 
position to make or influence policy decisions in substantive ways. For that Americans would 
need to look to their president, and to the genre of the State of the Union address in particular. 
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The Economic Bill of Rights part of the speech is a prime example of how economic discourse 
was used by President Roosevelt both to quell fear and uncertainty about the future and to shape 
the course of twentieth century liberalism. Chapter Three thus analyzes Roosevelt’s “Economic 
Bill of Rights,” which served as the conclusion to his 1944 State of the Union address. Because 
the President was too ill to make the speech to Congress in person, he recorded a shortened radio 
version that was broadcast to the nation in the evening. I use drafts of the speech electronically 
available from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, including the reading and 
stenographer’s copy of the radio address, to analyze the speech.  
Borrowing and extending the language of the nation’s founding documents, Roosevelt 
attempted to inscribe economic security as a fundamental human right, thus sealing his long 
presidential legacy and setting into motion a vision of American identity in the postwar world. 
He appropriated economic security as a “self-evident” truth, deserving of constitutional 
protection, for example. Building on his “Four Freedoms” speech, which was the peroration to 
the 1941 State of the Union address, and also on the language of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt 
enumerated two of those freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear—and argued that 
they should be legal rights, both in the United States and throughout the world via what would 
become the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.  
As another landmark in the history of globalization as it intersects with American 
identity, the Economic Bill of Rights offers a distinct view of globalism as constitutive rhetoric 
in an era of contingency. I argue that it tempers Willkie’s global optimism by acknowledging and 
managing public fear and scapegoating critics; Roosevelt effectively details what American daily 
life in a postwar interdependent global economy would feel like, emphasizing household 
financial security and the lived experience of Freedom from Want. This is an important historical 
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moment in which economic discourse was used to reassure Americans and to encourage them to 
imagine life in a peaceful postwar world.   
Yet the Economic Bill of Rights falls short of engaging the institutional details of what 
postwar economic security and international cooperation should look like. Chapter Four, then, 
turns to the Congressional debates about the Bretton Woods institutions in the summer of 1945 
as a site of rhetorical contestation and instance in which the discourse of globalism was 
institutionalized. There were two days of debate in the U.S. House on June 5- 6, 1945, and three 
and a half days of debate about the Bretton Woods proposals in the U.S. Senate on July 16-19, 
1945, the full text of which are available via the University of Illinois’ subscription to the 
HeinOnline legal database. Selecting this set of texts from the Congressional Record, rather than, 
for example, transcripts of the Bretton Woods conference, provides an opportunity to explore 
how a discourse of globalism was cultivated as an aspect of the American postwar imagination 
as well as made into concrete policy—in other words, to consider the instrumental and 
constitutive effects of another significant landmark in the history of globalism. Using the 
concepts of kairos and arguments from history, I show how both supporters and opponents of the 
Bretton Woods agreements positioned the moment as liminal, drawing on discourses of 
economics and expertise.   
The dissertation’s final chapter addresses how this study of an American rhetoric of 
globalism in World War II, thoroughly motivated by kairos in a time of radical uncertainty and 
economic anxiety, drew on historical arguments to invent a postwar path toward prosperity, 
equality, and peace. In turn, by considering the major landmarks along this rhetorical “road not 
taken,” the project contributes both to our historical understanding of the war era and to 
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contemporary issues of poverty, inequality and violence in the current era of neoliberal 
globalization.     
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CHAPTER TWO: WENDELL WILLKIE’S ONE WORLD 
  
    
“However important the role of bayonets and guns may have been in the 
development of mankind, the role of ideas has been vastly more important—and, 
in the long run, more conclusive.” – Wendell Willkie72 
 
On August 26, 1942, amid the deadliest war in history, while the battles in Europe, 
Russia, North Africa and the Pacific raged, Wendell Willkie embarked on a 49-day, 31,000-mile 
flight around the world in a former U.S. bomber converted for civilian transport, nicknamed The 
Gulliver. At that point in the war, the outcome was entirely uncertain: Stalingrad was under 
German siege, the British were suffering defeat in the Pacific and the Allies were losing control 
of the Middle East, Guadalcanal was in Japanese hands, and the systematic slaughter of Europe’s 
Jews had only just begun. But Willkie, ever cheerful, toured about Cairo, sipped coffee in 
Ankara, attended a lavish dinner in Baghdad, joked with Stalin, visited Soviet factories and 
collective farms, ate ice cream in China, breakfasted with the Generalissimo and fell in love with 
Madame Chiang. He came home to the U.S. to proclaim that the world is small, that the Russian 
soil is loamy, that the Turkish tobacco is excellent, that there is general good will toward 
Americans, and that only unfettered exchange of goods and ideas—not bayonets and guns—will 
ensure lasting postwar peace.  
The central question of this dissertation chapter is how the rhetoric of globalism became 
part of the American postwar imagination in an era of radical contingency. I argue that Wendell 
Willkie’s One World, a travelogue and campaign book, called into coherent and sustained 
presence a popular vocabulary of globalism. Printed under guidelines of the War Production 
Board (on light-weight paper with small margins in order to reduce paper, metal, and labor 
costs), the book used Willkie’s tremendous ethos to make the world—its people, ideas, and 
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goods—seem close and tangible. It prioritized humanity over otherness, friendship over war, and 
values over politics. In this way, the book might illustrate what Thomas Farrell described as 
rhetorical magnitude, a reordering and reconceptualizing of shared cultural ideas that serves to 
unsettle and perhaps redefine notions of national identity. Wrote Farrell, “a rhetorical culture is 
an encounter setting where magnitude is open to dispute, where the question ‘Why should I 
care?’ is… an invitation to demonstrate interdependence of significance.”73 Through One World, 
Americans could encounter a world at war through the eyes and ears of a well-liked public 
figure; they could be made to care differently about the economic prospects of a postwar world 
and their place within it.  
As Willkie states in the book, “If I ever had any doubts that the world has become small 
and completely interdependent, this trip would have dispelled them altogether.”74 Although he 
repeated this same essential message in countless speeches, radio addresses, syndicated news 
articles, and dramatized accounts, I have chosen the book as the site for analysis in this chapter 
because it serves as a container for Willkie’s ideas, the title One World a condensation symbol 
that summarizes his persuasive strategies. The book appeals to the reader’s imagination by 
developing its argument largely through sensory descriptions, and it also serves the pedagogical 
function of improving literacy, which was an important aspect of Willkie’s overarching global 
human rights agenda. Indeed, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a note of thank-you to Willkie for 
autographing a copy of the book for her, stating, “I envy the experience you have had in visiting 
so much of the world and hope your book will be widely read as a contribution toward educating 
the people of the United States a world point of view.”75 While Willkie’s relationship with 
Franklin Roosevelt and the Roosevelt presidential administration will be further detailed in this 
and the following chapter, the comment from the First Lady is notable because it demonstrates a 
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shared interest in globalism across political lines, a cause that Eleanor Roosevelt would go on to 
champion and that would become her own legacy. It shows that globalism was a powerful idea at 
a time when the future was uncertain. 
The book was widely distributed and discussed. Snippets and newspaper clippings from 
the New Yorker and other publications found in the Willkie archive at Indiana University 
celebrate the book’s popular success: “After selling 197,130 copies the first week, the book has 
settled down to a nice, steady 25,000 a day, and this may well go on until everybody has a copy.” 
Within weeks it was translated and published in German, French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, 
Turkish, and several Hindu languages. One account concluded that “all in all, The Willkie looks 
like the biggest thing since the Dionne Quintuplets.”76 
Much of the book’s popularity might be attributed to the close relationships that Willkie 
maintained with Republican internationalists Henry Luce, publisher of Life magazine and owner 
of Time Life, Inc., and Gardner “Mike” Cowles, publisher of LOOK magazine as well as several 
Midwestern newspapers. Cowles accompanied Willkie on the world trip, along with fellow 
newspaperman Joseph Barnes, both of whom wrote about and promoted the trip.77 Luce was a 
major financial and political supporter as well as confidant to Willkie; his The American 
Century, published in 1941 as an editorial in Life, argued for American moral leadership in a 
postwar international economy.78 In an undated private letter, Willkie wrote to Luce, the “readers 
of Life show by mere subscription to the magazine, that they are among the most astute in the 
world.” 79 Willkie respected his readers and wanted to reach the widest possible audience with 
One World, educating Americans for, as he wrote in the book, “it is plain that to win this war we 
must make it our war, the war of all of us. In order to do this we must all know as much about it 
as possible.”80 Holding democratic debate and public discourse in high esteem, he argued, “the 
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whiplash of public opinion, developed from honest, free discussion” constitutes “democracy’s 
greatest driving power.”81   
Offering globalism as a rhetorical counter to isolationism in American public discourse, 
One World reaches its audience by making the world seem familiar and tangible to everyday 
Americans. It creates what Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca call “presence” by 
choosing vivid and memorable examples to bring the world into perspective.82 For example, 
recounting his visit to the war front in Russia, Willkie quips, “in the bottom of a trench, I saw a 
can, unopened but half buried in the mud, marked LUNCHEON HAM in English, and I 
wondered on which other front in this global war the Germans had picked it up.”83 Similarly 
striking details can be found throughout the book, with Willkie approaching new, unfamiliar 
territory with a tone of clear-eyed curiosity; rather than fixating on scenes one would expect in a 
description of an ongoing war, he chooses to highlight how a can of lunch meat somehow found 
its way halfway around the globe. An important landmark in the rhetorical history of globalism, 
One World consistently uses strategies of ethos, presence, and the compression of geographical 
space to manipulate the perceived size of the globe, compelling Americans to see themselves as 
economic participants in an optimistic postwar global future.  
The following chapter proceeds in three parts: first, I contextualize Willkie’s trip and One 
World within the political climate of the war era, focusing on the relationship between Willkie 
and Roosevelt as well as Willkie’s post-election efforts to support the Lend-Lease Act. Second, I 
show how the book uses the strategies of ethos, presence, and compression of space to influence 
globalism’s rhetorical magnitude in war-era discourse. Ultimately, for Willkie, globalism in the 
postwar planning era was an optimistic rhetoric of international cooperation.  
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Political Context 
 
The 1940 Election 
 
Willkie’s candidacy and popularity was important in shaping presidential and public 
discourse during the war, yet it usually appears as a side-note in rhetorical scholarship; attending 
to Willkie’s influence thus offers the field of rhetorical studies a more complex understanding of 
the era.  A well-known figure in American business and politics, Willkie was a young attorney 
from Indiana who became president of Commonwealth & Southern, a utility holding company, 
in the early 1930s. Throughout the 1930s he fought publically against Roosevelt’s efforts to 
nationalize utilities via the Tennessee Valley Authority, and in 1939 Willkie switched his 
political party affiliation from lifelong Democrat to Republican. Roosevelt’s court packing 
efforts, ideas about establishing several regional authorities like the TVA, and decision to run for 
a third term in office fueled criticisms that the President was grasping for too much power, 
thereby setting the stage for the Willkie presidential candidacy in 1940.84 While Willkie 
supported many of the President’s policies and respected the office itself, he also allowed 
himself during the campaign to feed into the circulating rumors that accused Roosevelt of 
dictatorial tendencies.85   
As Susan Dunn explains in her history of the 1940 election, though Willkie had embraced 
the New Deal policies generally, and particularly federal regulations of securities markets, he 
indicated that by 1940 the New Deal had run its course. He argued that it was no longer 
promoting economic growth and production, and also that the federal bureaucracy had become 
bloated with regulations to the extent that it was stifling free enterprise.86 Willkie won the 1940 
Republican presidential nomination as a dark horse candidate, and he ran what was considered to 
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be a tight race against Roosevelt. Local “Willkie Clubs” popped up in cities and towns 
throughout the country to support a beloved candidate with strong home-spun, populist appeal.  
Willkie spoke to the concerns of a wide range of Americans. Dunn notes, “In Midwestern 
centers like Omaha and Minneapolis, [Willkie] focused on the interdependence of agriculture 
and industry. The problems of the farmer, laborer, businessman, investor and consumer were all 
one.”87 At the same time, Willkie was seen as an “articulate spokesman for business interests and 
as a reasoned critic of what he saw as excessive regulation,”88 writes Richard Moe. He “came 
across as a reasonable, thoughtful, and sometimes self-critical Midwesterner who spoke the 
language of common sense,” affectionately nicknamed “Wall Street’s barefoot boy.” 89 
Although—or perhaps because—Willkie’s policy positions were actually quite close to 
Roosevelt’s, he was the Republicans’ best hope for president.90 He, of course, lost to Roosevelt 
in the end but managed to gain more popular votes than any Republican before him.91  
 
The Lend-Lease Trip 
Soon after the 1940 election, Roosevelt capitalized on Willkie’s popularity, asking him to 
go to London in a widely-publicized trip to advocate for Lend-Lease and to meet with officials 
on the President’s behalf. Michael Fullilove writes, “by entrusting Willkie with a foreign 
mission—the delivery of a personal message of support to the British prime minister—Roosevelt 
turned his former opponent into an instrument of his diplomacy.”92 Over the next three years, 
Roosevelt would court Willkie for similar errands and political favors that attempted to unify the 
American public and persuade Republicans in Congress, first around support for the war effort 
and then postwar internationalism.  
What Fullilove calls the “Willkie effect”93 was certainly a powerful phenomenon. One 
letter, found among the dozens of penny postcards collected in Willkie’s files related to the trip 
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to England, expresses his widespread, non-partisan appeal: “Dear Mr. Willkie, I am a staunch 
Democrat and used all my influence to fight against you in the campaign. I think that you have 
now proved yourself a true American statesman, and I wish to inform you that I, as all true 
Americans must, stand in full support of your policy. Hoping to see you become President of the 
United States of America.”94 Another gleams, “God bless you and speed you – America’s 
beloved son. Ambassador of good-will to Great Britain. Spread your cheer – your happy smile – 
and God’s love – where the wounded don’t cry – let this message leap high into the breeze…and 
bring you safely back.”95 
Encouraged by his mistress Irita van Doren, who was the book review editor for the New 
York Herald Tribune, Willkie enjoyed the attention that his trip received.96 He spoke on the 
radio, published articles, and testified in front of Congress in support of Lend-Lease. He was also 
conflicted, however, about his reputation as the president’s proxy and envoy, asserting that his 
role and opinions were his own, that they were those of a private citizen. 97 Uniquely positioned 
in this way, he could, for example, be critical of the British colonial system when Roosevelt 
could not. Willkie would later write about the British military officials that he conversed with in 
Egypt, “These men, executing the policies made in London, had no idea that the world was 
changing.”98 While his trip in 1941 helped Americans to understand that England needed their 
help, his later statements about colonialism would be a point of tension between Willkie and the 
Roosevelt administration.  
 
 
President vs. Public Citizen 
With the 1942 trip around the globe and subsequent publication of One World, the 
complex political and personal dynamic between Willkie and Roosevelt deepened. Some 
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scholars of the era explain Willkie and One World in terms of political strategy, suggesting, as 
Robert Dallek does, that the book was a threat to the President because it meant that he would 
need to gain the support of Willkie internationalists in the 1944 election.99 While that might be 
true, I am more interested in how the Willkie and Roosevelt relationship functioned rhetorically 
to create an audience for globalism, bringing the American public around from an isolationist to 
globalist mindset, for, as Henry Luce wrote to Willkie in 1942, “the American people are neither 
to be wangled or hijacked into internationalism.”100    
The relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie was not smooth. In the book, Willkie 
navigates his positions as a Republican politician, private citizen, and informal representative for 
the President. He writes about his trip to Russia and Siberia, “Besides my concrete assignments 
for the President, I had gone [to Russia] determined to find an answer for myself to the actual 
problems posed for our generation of Americans…”101 Despite explicit instructions from the 
Roosevelt administration not to meddle in the war effort or make military recommendations, 
however, Willkie overstepped his role by calling for a second war front to help Russia stave off 
the German offensive. 102 He had not been briefed on the imminent Allied invasion of North 
Africa requiring military resources and war materials.  
The 1944 election would see more tension between Roosevelt and Willkie. President 
Roosevelt still needed the support of internationalists, but he also needed to appease Southern 
Democrats. His Vice President and longtime Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, was seen 
as too radical to hold the highest office; Willkie, who ran in the Republican primary against 
isolationist Thomas Dewey, was slaughtered in Wisconsin and bowed out of the race. 103 During 
the summer of 1944, with the public release of the letter from Roosevelt summoning Willkie to 
the White House, rumors flew about a third Liberal party or a Willkie vice presidency. 
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Ultimately, however, in the choice of Truman for Vice President, Roosevelt moved away from a 
“one world” internationalism to a liberal postwar vision based on great powers and spheres of 
influence.104  
Willkie was tired of partisanship, politics, and the President’s attempts to co-opt him.105 
In August of 1944 he confided to his friend Mike Cowles, “My dear Mike: You need have no 
fears about my accepting any position from either Franklin Roosevelt or Thomas Dewey. I am so 
fed up on pragmatic politicians that there is no inducement that would prompt me to serve under 
either of them in any capacity.”106 Willkie suffered a heart attack while traveling by train to 
Indiana, was ill and hospitalized for several weeks in New York, and eventually succumbed to a 
series of chronic attacks and infections by early October, 1944, at the age of 52.  
 
One World 
 
One World carries a tone of urgency. Willkie’s purpose in the book is to turn American 
public sentiment away from isolationism and toward a global perspective, a shift in thinking that 
he argues must occur before war’s end—otherwise, as he and others feared, an opportunity may 
be lost in the same way that hope for a peaceful world order was lost when President Wilson’s 
League of Nations failed to be supported by the U.S. Congress, a theme that will be further 
explored in Chapter Four, on the 1945 arguments surrounding the Bretton Woods agreements. 
Willkie writes, “For I live in constant dread that this war may end before the people of the world 
have come to a common understanding of what they fight for and what they hope for after the 
war is over.”107 Using his widespread popularity, Willkie’s trip around the globe and subsequent 
book attempted to educate Americans about the world and bring globalism into mainstream 
public discourse.  
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One World begins with Willkie’s tours of North Africa and the Middle East. Here and 
throughout the book, he uses sensory details to familiarize his audience with parts of the world 
that they likely know little about, repeating the phrases, “…things I saw and learned at first 
hand…”;108 “…I saw with my own eyes…”;109 “…I had also seen with my own eyes;”110 “I was 
convinced from all I had seen and heard…;”111 “I saw with my own eyes…;”112 and “Judging by 
what I saw myself…”113 The first scenes of the book detail Willkie’s travels to Cairo and to the 
front at El Alamein, where he meets with American troops. He states, “On the way back to 
General Montgomery’s headquarters, he summed up what I had seen and heard.”114 While 
Willkie’s use of ethos as a rhetorical strategy will be discussed below, here in the opening pages 
of the book Willkie sets himself up as a trustworthy travel guide and narrator, describing Cairo, 
Tehran, Beirut, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Ankara in vivid terms and unflagging optimism for the 
future.  
The next chapter, “Our Ally, Russia,” remains hopeful but takes on a somewhat more 
serious tone. Willkie states that “the Soviet Union, whether we like it or not, exists.”115 His 
attempts to find commonalities and ways to co-exist are sometimes met with resistance. When 
Willkie encourages Russia to send composer Dmitiri Shostakovich to visit the United States, he 
is told that the suggestion is insulting, for example.116 When he enters “ten minutes of hot 
colloquy” with a belligerent aviation factory worker, debating the notion of freedom in a 
communist system, Willkie’s pilot Richard Kight intervenes and smooths over the argument by 
speaking about his own patriotism and military service to the United States.117 Willkie concludes 
the chapter by stating that “we need to learn to work with [Russia]….We need to learn to work 
with her in the world after the war.”118 Venturing further into the Soviet Republic of Yakutsk, 
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Willkie again comes to the conclusion that the U.S. and Russia “must work together for the 
economic welfare and the peace of the world.”119 
In China, too, Willkie seeks postwar cooperation and seeks to confront “our conventional 
prejudices about the world” by educating Americans about the people of China.120 He states, “It 
is unfortunate that so many Americans still think of China in terms of great inert masses and not 
in terms of people, still think of the death of five million Chinese as something different and less 
costly than the death of five million Westerners.”121 This leg of Willkie’s trip had in fact been in 
the making as early as the spring of 1941, when Willkie began working with Henry and Clare 
Luce, Eleanor Roosevelt, and other high-level figures on United China Relief efforts. In a 
handwritten note to Willkie, Luce remarked, “All I can say is that 450,000,000 Chinese plus 
Clare would be tremendously happy if you would visit Chungking. Since you would have to do 
all the talking I would like to insist on taking care of all the arrangements and expenses. Yours, 
Henry.”122 Whether and the extent to which Luce eventually provided financial support for 
Willkie’s world tour is unclear; however, Luce’s letter illustrates an interest, at least among 
elites, in adopting and promoting a rhetoric of globalism during the war, and especially in 
opening up China’s cultural and economic resources.123     
One World worked to promote a rhetoric of globalism among the American public using 
three related elements: ethos, presence, and the compression of space and time. Willkie’s book 
brought the world to the American public imagination through sensory description, offering an 
optimistic vision of postwar peace through international economic cooperation. Farrell writes 
that “Aristotle defined the locus of the rhetorical as that which has not been decided, that which 
still appeared to speakers and audiences as unsettled.”124 For readers of Willkie’s book, in a time 
of contingency, the world was made more friendly, present, vivid, and intimately connected.  
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Ethos  
Debra Hawhee draws a connection between ethos and perception, stating that a speaker’s 
reputation serves to heighten the impression left in an audience’s imagination.125 In the case of 
Willkie’s One World, readers can imagine vividly the people and places Willkie visits because of 
his remarkable ethos. In the Aristotelian sense of which Eugene Garver writes, Willkie possessed 
the characteristics of friendship and goodwill, philia and eunoia, that constitute ethos.126 He 
explicitly wanted to introduce a moral—and global—outlook toward social and economic life.  
Ethos, however, includes not just a set of individual traits but is rather a social act that 
occurs between the rhetor and the audience. Craig R. Smith explains that Aristotle’s 
understanding of ethos “presupposes ethos as a dwelling place.”127 Nedra Reynolds describes 
ethos as “a complex set of characteristics” that are “constructed” and provisionally “sanctioned” 
by a group.128 The interaction between rhetor and audience can thus serve as a site to clarify 
shared values and, as Judy Holiday explains, as a powerful source of invention and 
reinvention.129 Through Willkie’s use of ethos, readers of One World could locate themselves, 
and their values, in an optimistic narrative that countered the concurrent, prevailing, and fear-
riddled public discourse about the ongoing war.  
In the summer of 1942 in Egypt, British forces (with the help of Australian, New 
Zealand, Canadian, South African, and American troops) were attempting to force German 
troops out of the desert. In one of the book’s first scenes, Willkie describes talking with 
approximately thirty Americans, discovering that they together represent eighteen different 
states. Willkie writes, “They seemed well and were frank about their desire to get back to the 
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United States and they plied me with eager questions about the Dodgers and the Cardinals, who 
were then in the final race for the pennant…..there were no heroics, no big talk.  They were just a 
group of physically hard, alert American boys who were wondering when they’d next see Texas, 
Broadway, and the Iowa farm.”130 With a visit to American troops among the first stops in 
Willkie’s world tour, readers are met early in the book with the familiar faces of their American 
sons, fathers and husbands. Willkie establishes honesty and humility as universal qualities of 
character that he will continue to observe as he meets other people during his trip.  
In Cairo, he states, “There were good men there…..Nahas Pasha, who has so much gusto 
and good humor….”131 Throughout the Middle East he equates facial and physical characteristics 
with ethos, echoing a discourse of physisognomy, that, though scientifically disproven, remained 
a strategy used to assess character through physical appearance:132 “…a curiously charming and 
impressive soldier, with a soft, quiet face and voice…;”133 “I liked the men I met in Iraq;”134 
“…Turkey looked good to me….It looked good because I saw a great many tough and honest 
faces…;”135 and “You see this in the faces of people you talk with; you hear it in their 
speech.”136 Meeting with Henrietta Szold, Jewish American Zionist leader in Jerusalem, Willkie 
is hopeful that Palestine question “can be solved by good will and simple honesty,” for “…as I 
sat there that late afternoon with the sun shining through the windows, lighting up that 
intelligent, sensitive face, I, at least for a moment, wondered if she in her mature, selfless 
wisdom might not know more than all the ambitious politicians.”137 In each of these remarks, 
Willkie uses his and others’ ethos as a means for establishing globalism as the basis of postwar 
peace.  
Willkie’s character descriptions continue throughout his travels in Russia. One 
Lieutenant General, “a man so colorful and engaging,” Willkie describes, “is a man of medium 
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height, powerfully built, a born horseman with bowed legs betraying his Cossack origin, ruddy, 
vital, alert, full of animal spirits.”138 Another, the worker in the aviation factory with whom 
Willkie argued at length about Soviet Communism, “was dressed in worker’s clothes….with an 
alert, almost jaunty manner, energetic, intelligent, and with a thorough knowledge of his job; the 
kind of young man that in American industrial life would make rapid advancement…”139 A hotel 
in Yakutsk “was filled with tough-looking men in leather coats and boots made of reindeer fur. 
The girls were red-cheeked, with handkerchiefs tied around their heads.”140 Willkie states of one 
high official that “many of his characteristics and much of his career were curiously like those of 
many Americans I have known. He is a short, stocky man, with a round, smiling, clean-shaven 
face.”141 At every turn, Willkie emphasizes what American readers might have in common with 
those people he meets halfway around the world.  
The same approach is used even to describe Joseph Stalin, with whom Willkie met at 
length on President Roosevelt’s behalf. Because this part of Willkie’s tour was more like official 
diplomacy and less like a private citizen touring the globe, Willkie deflects conversations about 
war and postwar strategy by turning to Stalin’s character. He states, “much of what was said I am 
not at liberty to report. But about the man himself there is no reason to be cautious.”142 Willkie 
goes on to detail Stalin’s physical appearance: “about five feet four or five, and gives the 
appearance of slight stockiness… but his head, his mustache, and his eyes are big. His face, in 
repose, is a hard face….He talks quietly, readily, and at times with a simple, moving 
eloquence….He has…a hard, tenacious, driving mind.”143 A few pages later, by way of 
summary, he writes, “Stalin is a simple man, with no affectations or poses. He does not seek to 
impress by any artificial mannerisms. His sense of humor is a robust one, and he laughs readily 
at unsubtle jokes and repartee”144 For Willkie, the same qualities of character—humility, 
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honesty, humor—are thus universalized across all national, political, economic, racial, linguistic, 
and religious differences. His use of ethos has a levelling effect that presents even a communist 
dictator as an average person, not to be feared.      
In China, Willkie continues to use ethos—his own and that of those he meets—as a 
rhetorical strategy. He positions himself as an outsider, stating, “even our fellow diners… looked 
at me with curiosity which suggested that many of them were seeing an American for the first 
time in their lives. Yet there was a warmth and a friendliness in their reception of me…”145 In 
Lanchow, he is given a parade that he knows is merely a show of state propaganda. He describes 
Chinese children and adults, “barefoot or dressed in rags,” with no “clear idea of who I was or 
why I was there,” yet, he writes, “this scene moved me profoundly. There was nothing synthetic 
or fake about the faces I looked at.”146 Again, ethos, as reflected in the faces of common people 
throughout the globe, becomes a means by which Willkie’s readers can see themselves and their 
own character values. It also invites readers to see Willkie himself—although rich and politically 
well-connected—as someone with whom they can identify. 
In addition to using ethos to connect everyday Americans to everyday people worldwide, 
Willkie uses character and physical descriptions to demystify leaders and high government 
figures who may seem unable to relate to those with whom they have little in common. Of 
Chiang Kai-shek, or “The Generalissimo,” in fact, Willkie claims that “possibly no other country 
on our side in this war is so dominated by the personality of one man as China.”147 He then goes 
on in detail: “…the Generalissimo, both as a man and as a leader, is bigger even than his 
legendary reputation. He is a strangely quiet, soft-spoken man….he wears Chinese dress… 
almost a clerical scholar—rather than a political leader. He is obviously a trained listener… a 
reflective manner, a quiet poise, and an occasional appearance of thinking out loud.”148 About 
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Communist leader General Chou, Willkie writes, “he has an open face, with wide-spaced, 
serious eyes.”149 Further on, “another man who impressed me deeply was Dr. Chang Po-ling. He 
is an enormous man, with the grave, deliberative manner of a scholar but a fine, warm sense of 
humor.”150 Finally, “the other was General J. L. Huang, Secretary General of the Officers’ Moral 
Endeavor Association. The general is as big and robust as his laugh, which is very big.”151  
Willkie’s own larger-than-life personality finds its match in Madame Chiang Kai-shek. 
The wealthy, Wellesley-educated Madame Chiang spoke fluent English and was active in 
Chinese politics, taking up as her personal cause orphans (“warphans”) of Chinese soldiers lost 
in the war with Japan. She was named TIME person of the year in 1937, along with her husband, 
and appeared on the cover on two other occasions.152 In One World, Willkie hopes to use 
Madame Chiang’s popularity in the United States, writing, “someone from this section with 
brains and persuasiveness and moral force must educate us about China and India and their 
peoples. Madame would be the perfect ambassador.”153 Within a year of Willkie’s trip, Madame 
Chiang did make one of many visits to the United States, addressing Congress in February, 1943. 
The two visited together at the Waldorf in New York throughout her stay in the U.S. Willkie on 
one occasion writing a note to “My dear May” and thanking her for the time “the delightful chats 
we had together… and also your little lectures.”154  
Another letter from Willkie to Mme. Chiang introduces William Sloane, Vice President 
of Henry Holt Publishing Co., who was traveling to China in 1943 in order to facilitate the 
exchange of books and to work on translating Chinese books into English and American books 
into Chinese. Willkie states, “I know of no better way to cement friendly relations between our 
two countries than to bind them together culturally.” 155 Ethos, in this case in the form of a 
cultural exchange and mutual appreciation, was globalism’s insurance against war.  
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Presence 
 
Willkie provides for readers a sense of identification with people and places with which 
they would otherwise be unfamiliar, creating presence. His descriptions and examples are 
striking and memorable to the reader. “By the very fact of selecting certain elements and 
presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied,” 
write Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: “Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a 
presence…”156 Willkie’s use of the rhetorical strategies of presence, along with ethos and the 
compression of time and space, all serve to shape an optimistic understanding of the postwar 
world as economically interconnected.  
Reviewing Perelman’s work, Alan Gross and Ray Dearin explain, “…to be persuaded is 
to live in a world made different by the persuader.”157 Throughout the book, Willkie draws 
comparisons that are tangible and familiar to Americans in order make a different world: to 
introduce regions and people from around the world who would otherwise seem foreign and 
unfamiliar. Echoing President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor rhetoric, he invites readers to think of 
themselves as neighbors to the world, concluding that “All around the world, there are some 
ideas which millions and millions of men hold in common, almost as much as if they lived in the 
same town.”158 The economics of Willkie’s world are uncomplicated: “They would like to deal 
with us. They are prepared to trade goods. They produce, in Turkey, nearly one-quarter of the 
world’s supply of chrome. Their tobacco and their cotton are badly needed by other 
countries….They need foodstuffs—wheat especially—and they need manufactures and 
machinery…”159 Globalism’s tenor is neighborly and familiar, with Willkie describing the 
mundane details of his trip in terms with which readers might identify. He talks about wearing 
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uncomfortable clothing in the North African desert, for example: “I had bought, at a French 
department store in Cairo, a khaki shirt and trousers, both several sizes too small for me…”160 
About what he ate there: “The lunch was sandwiches—and flies.”161  
Willkie makes reference to sites that would be recognizable to Americans. Along the 
Volga River in Russia, for example, he sees large country homes that “reminded me of the great 
houses one sees from a Hudson River boat.”162 About a library in Yaktusk, he writes, “this was a 
library any town of its size might well be proud of.”163 He notes a power development project 
that, “if completed, would produce twice as much power as all the TVA, Grand Coulee, and the 
Bonneville developments combined.”164 Everywhere in the world, for Willkie, there is economic 
potential and cultural progress. By comparing houses, government buildings, and infrastructure 
to specific and generic sites in the American landscape, he makes globalism familiar, present, 
and forward-looking.  
The book is especially filled with comparisons to Willkie’s home state of Indiana, 
keeping with the populist appeal that won him the 1940 nomination. He visits an 8,000-acre 
farming collective that houses 55 families, “a ratio of about 140 acres per family, which is about 
the size of the average farm in Rush County, Indiana.”165  Examining the crops, he writes, “The 
soil was good—a dark, rich loam, but the rainfall was slight, only some thirteen inches per year. 
In Indiana we have about forty.”166 When, because of currency instability, Willkie and the farmer 
cannot figure out the acreage yield of wheat, rye and other small grains, “we gave up trying to 
arrive at a comparable price per bushel in American money.  For all quotations were given us in 
rubles, and we found that the value of the ruble is subject to rapid fluctuation and varies in 
different markets.  We could, however, judge the quality of the grain, and it seemed to us 
good.”167 Although Willkie does not have a background in farming, he speaks in these examples 
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as a businessman with enough knowledge about the land and yields to be able to argue for 
equitable trade and currency parity. Appealing to everyday American readers, he distills a 
complex global economic problem into simple and tangible terms.  
Willkie also presents the people he meets and homes he visits with an air of nostalgia 
about his Indiana childhood. He describes the farm manager’s “small stone house, simple, and in 
atmosphere not very different from a prosperous farmhouse in the United States….the wife of 
the manager, who had cooked the meal, urged me to eat as I have been urged many times in 
Indiana farmhouses…”168 Neighborhoods are easy for readers to picture: “The pavements along 
the bigger streets were boardwalks, like those I remember in Elwood when I was a boy. The 
houses had the neat, buttoned up look of homes in any northern town, with light from the 
windows and soft smoke coming from the chimneys.”169 After a bumpy and uncomfortable ride 
in an American Jeep in Russia, Willkie states, “I really understood the stories my father used to 
tell me of conditions in pioneer Indiana.”170   
The theme of economic development and westward expansion carries throughout the 
book. Willkie draws comparisons to the American West, stating for example that Yakutsk 
“seemed… like a western town in this country a generation ago. In fact, much of this life 
reminded me of our own early and expanding days…”171 Connecting again to the ethos and 
character of the region, he writes, “These people have developed an enthusiasm and a self-
confidence which reminded me repeatedly of the romance of our own Western development.”172 
When Willkie presses a Soviet leader “for details about the economic development of Yakutsk, 
he talked like a California real-estate salesman.”173 In China, the same strategy continues: “I felt 
in Tihwa and in Lanchow and in the country between those cities a curious resemblance to our 
own American West in the days when it was being opened up. The people seemed tall and 
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resourceful…”174 On the next page of the book, Willkie reiterates, “the opening up of this new 
China compares only, in modern history, with the opening up of our own West.”175 By drawing 
comparisons to goods and ideas that would be familiar to American readers—ill-fitting trousers, 
rich soil, farm houses, westward expansion—Willkie offers a forward-looking view of global 
economic development. 
If Willkie’s use of comparisons serves to offer readers an understanding of the world as 
optimistic and present, so does his strategy of juxtaposition and contrast. This can be seen in a 
rhetor’s use of the stylistic form of antithesis at the sentence level, as Jeanne Fahnestock has 
pointed out.176 Willkie writes, for example, “Russia is neither going to eat us nor seduce us. That 
is…unless our democratic institutions and our free economy become so frail through abuse and 
failure in practice as to make us soft and vulnerable. The best answer to Communism is a living, 
vibrant, fearless democracy—economic, social, and political.”177 Here, Willkie uses a parallel 
construction of neither… nor, a conditional if… then, and dashed punctuation to emphasize his 
overall argument that shared American values are strong enough to sustain a system of postwar 
global peace. As an argumentative strategy per Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the comparison 
of opposites—“several  objects are considered in order to evaluate them through their relations to 
each other”—informs and encourages rhetorical presence.178  
Alan Gross explains that presence, however, is not a purely rational form of persuasion; 
rather, it includes an element of creativity and imagination.179 In her work on how Civil War 
photographs worked on the imaginations of viewers, Cara Finnegan similarly describes 
presence’s affective dimensions.180 John Murphy has likewise explained how Al Gore’s use of 
analogies shaped audiences’ rational and felt understanding of environmental crisis through 
presence.181 Both of these scholars observe presence as a rhetorical strategy in the face of 
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catastrophe, almost otherworldly and beyond rational vocabulary. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca describe “showing the ambiguity of the situation and the various ways of understanding 
it” in order to behold a certain “conception of the world.”182 
Almost at a loss for words, Willkie defaults to an embrace of juxtaposition and ambiguity 
in the portrayals of the world that serve in the book to establish presence. He describes, for 
example, “Underfed and scrawny children playing in the dirty streets of the old city at Jerusalem, 
young French cadets on the airfield at Beirut, Arab boys and girls of ten working in a blanket 
factory in Bagdad, Polish refugees camped in great barracks outside Teheran,” concluding that 
“the first picture I had of this region we call the Middle East was one of contrasts, sharp colors, 
and confusion.”183 Especially in the Middle East, he approaches such contrasts and juxtapositions 
as “amusing manifestations of an international society.”184  
Often the juxtaposition is between old and new, ancient and modern, allowing Willkie to 
eventually make an argument in favor of modernity’s economic progress while embracing the 
wisdom of the past. In Egypt, he writes, 
All along the way we passed through a strange medley of the ancient and the modern. 
Long camel trains with their native riders streamed by loaded with products of the Nile 
Valley, and rows of modern trucks haled back to Cairo high-powered modern fighting 
planes to be repaired in modern machine shops—and always in the distance we could see 
those reminders of ancient Egyptian glory, the Sphinx and the pyramids.185 
 
From Beirut to Jerusalem, he exclaims, “Never was the contrast between old and new 
more dramatic.”186 He describes Ankara as “modern, with part of an ancient village left on a hill 
as if to remind the Turks how far they have already gone….The streets are full of cars; the 
people are well dressed and busy; the buildings are new and good-looking.”187 Implying that 
economic progress means social progress, he describes veiled women in Turkey as an 
“anachronism,” and in sum, claims that “Turks have literally and figuratively abolished the veils 
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of the ancient East.”188 Willkie asks readers to step back and look at the world from his wide 
perspective, to see an overall trajectory of global social progress.  
When his descriptions veer into the territory of the unfamiliar, Willkie uses a strategy of 
contrast to find connection with readers through the mundane. For example, about a small town 
in Sinkiang province in China, he writes, “It is small, sleepy-looking, and incredibly muddy. The 
street signs are in Russian, the government is Chinese, the people are Turkis, part of the 
20,000,000 Moslems who live inside the frontiers of China.” In the next sentence, he concludes, 
“It boasts the finest melons in Asia and some small, seedless grapes as good as any I have ever 
eaten.”189 By establishing his account of the world within realm of the familiar—muddy streets, 
seedless grapes—Willkie maintains his ethos and identification with readers. In yet another 
vignette among several that center around the tour’s many extravagant meals, he explains, “Mike 
Cowles had been ill the day before, after eating as an experiment some creamed shark’s lip. So 
he was particularly pleased when the dessert at the banquet was good old-fashioned vanilla ice 
cream.”190 Whereas Cowles tells the story differently,191 Willkie uses it to emphasize an attitude 
of hearty curiosity and embrace of that which is foreign.  
Willkie’s uses of contradiction and ambiguity demonstrate his understanding of 
American readers, whose fear and uncertainty about the future was likely to have been informed 
by their experiences in the recent past. His commentary on the global transition into twentieth-
century modernity would have rung true for Americans still reeling from the struggles of daily 
life during the Depression. About the Middle East, he acknowledges, for example, that 
technology, industry, and infrastructure are but “a thin veneer on the surface of a life… simple 
and hard.”192 Rural Americans would have been able to identify with his description of Siberia, 
where “Reindeer are still the chief motive power of the republic, but there are now some 
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hundreds of tractors….The republic even has 160 combines…”193 The immediacy and proximity 
of past and future create a visceral sense of presence.  
 
Compression of geographic space  
 
Understanding the war and postwar society as worldwide required a shift in perspective 
among everyday Americans about their position on the globe, and the uncertainty produced by 
this shift can be seen in the sometimes skewed understandings of place and proximity reflected 
in public and private discourse. For example, a self-described “very anxious mother” from 
Kansas City wrote a handwritten note to Willkie in search of her son, who “was recently sent to 
China on [sic] foreign news-paper assignment and I’m sure you must have met him, if not on 
your journey, in China. We had letters from him in Brazil and Egypt and then a cable which told 
us he was o.k. so we feel that it must have been from China. Would you be kind enough to tell us 
whether or not you saw him and if he was O.K.?” Another mother, from New York City, 
desperately underlined her words, “won’t you please, Mr. Willkie tell me how they are – and if 
they are ever coming home? Three years is a long time – just waiting And I love them 
so….Won’t you let me know how my son looked – if he is well and are they very unhappy over 
there?” These are among dozens of similar letters requesting information about loved ones 
abroad. From Peoria, Illinois, a woman seeks news of her brother, who “is a big fellow with a big 
smile and pleasing personality.” Another, “my only brother and only son of his widowed mother 
is stationed [in Chunking]. He is a tall red-headed officer…”194  
Often Willkie replied to these letters that, unfortunately, he did not remember seeing the 
young man in question; to a mother in Berkeley he says that he inquired but could get no more 
information about her son “other than he was away resting.”195 Others he did answer in the 
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affirmative: “He was in excellent health, feeling well and seemed to be in the very best of 
spirits.”196 These exchanges illustrate, on the one hand, an overwhelming fear of the 
geographical distance separating Americans from the wars in Europe and the Pacific; on the 
other hand, they show a certain intimacy—that Willkie could receive and individually reply to 
handwritten notes from mothers and siblings across the country, and that in some cases he had 
actually seen and spoken with their loved ones, suggests that the world is not so large, after all. 
Indeed, news traveled faster with Wendell Willkie than it did with the U.S. Military Postal 
Service.    
One World used the compression of geographic space as a rhetorical strategy to advance 
globalism in the WWII era, making the world small and imaginable. With the rise of air travel in 
the era came a renewed interest in cartography and mapping, both in public discourse and as part 
of official military strategy. As Amy Spellacy writes in an article about cartography in the era of 
“air-age globalism,” maps were used explicitly to educate Americans about the world; as 
aerospace technologies allowed for earth to be seen from higher up in the air, new perspectives 
changed perceptions about distance and proximity. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, in particular, 
she writes, “it became eminently clear to the United States that it was not out of the range of the 
reach of its enemies. This catastrophic event illustrated that the word need to be imagined as an 
interconnected system.”197 Understanding cartography in the WWII era as rhetorical, Timothy 
Barney similarly considers how Americans and military strategists re-imagined the world and 
their role in it by way of maps that shifted from a hemispheric to global perspective, often 
centering around the Arctic Circle so that the U.S. was seen in proximity to northern Europe, 
Russia, and China.198 He writes, “Air-age maps displaced our sense of expected direction in 
viewing the world, and changed notions of distance and proximity: the world seemed more 
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interdependent and closer but also more susceptible to one’s vantage point and national 
interests.”199 
The book One World has on its front and back covers such a map, showing Willkie’s 
route around the globe in a roughly circular shape with the Arctic route from Russia to Alaska at 
the top. Willkie writes, “When you fly around the world in forty-nine days, you learn that the 
world has become small not only on the map, but also in the minds of men.200 The rhetorical 
strategies of ethos, comparison, and contradiction perhaps culminate in Willkie’s use of the 
compression of time and space in order to constitute globalism. Distance is presented in terms of 
time rather than miles: “we were in the air a total of only 160 hours.”201 Air travel is made easy: 
“…no more arduous than the trips an American businessman may make any day of his life to 
carry on his business.”202 Strangers are made familiar: “…the myriad millions of human beings 
of the Far East are as close to us as Los Angeles is to New York by the fastest trains.”203 In all, 
One World serves to educate American readers, asking them to contemplate, ponder, imagine an 
interdependent postwar world, for “…an airplane gives a modern traveler a chance to map in his 
mind the land he is flying over.”204  
For Willkie, postwar peace depended upon the free exchange of goods and ideas in a 
world made suddenly small by war and technological advancement. About a Soviet leader in 
Siberia, he writes, “He had obviously been planning in terms of international trade. ‘When this 
war is over, you in America are going to need wood and wood pulp. And we’re going to need 
machines, all kinds of machines. We’re not so far away from you, as soon as we get the Arctic 
sea route open. Come and get it; we’ll be glad to swap.’”205 About the mountains in Western 
China, he writes, “These red hills are unbelievably lovely to look at from the air, but I could not 
see them without thinking what wealth they represented to a nation determined to open up its 
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west.”206 By way of summarizing the trip, he states, “Good will has also been stored up for us, 
like credit in a bank account, by those Americans who have pioneered in the opening of new 
roads, new airways, new shipping lines.”207 Readers thus understand globalism as the ever more 
efficient exchange of goods and culture and as the modern future.  
While One World is generally less about the ongoing war and more about the future 
peace, Willkie also uses the compression of time and space as an argumentative strategy in 
calling for the U.S. military support for Russia and China. He states, “At the end of the last war, 
not a single plane had flown across the Atlantic. Today that ocean is a mere ribbon, with 
airplanes making regular scheduled flights. The Pacific is only a slightly wider ribbon in the 
ocean of the air, and Europe and Asia are at our very doorstep.”208 If Japanese imperial efforts 
are not halted, he writes, “it would not matter in the least how wide or narrow the Pacific Ocean 
is.”209 Here Willkie explicitly confronts the isolationist sentiment that the U.S. was protected by 
its oceans. The book that began with cheery optimism and banter moves toward a serious critique 
of U.S. isolationism and provincialism. He writes, “When I say that peace must be planned on a 
world basis, I mean quite literally that it must embrace the earth. Continents and oceans are 
plainly only parts of a whole, seen, as I have seen them, from the air.”210 Having established his 
credibility as a narrator, Willkie invites readers to see and understand the world—and their 
position in it—from an altitude only recently elevated by modern air travel.  
This shift in perspective also requires readers to examine their own prejudices. One 
World makes the world seem less monolithic and more accessible. Willkie writes, for example, 
about the Soviet Union, that it “covers an enormous territory, bigger than the United States, 
Canada, and Central America combined. The people are of many different races and 
nationalities, speaking many languages.”211 As shown above, Willkie embraces and celebrates 
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contrast and contradiction--“…we drank English whisky and ate Russian caviar and danced to 
American music in the curious internationalism of the diplomatic world.”212—and challenges 
readers to address what he calls ‘imperialisms at home,’ namely systemic racism. For Willkie, 
postwar peace cannot be sustained if Americans do not adopt an all-encompassing world outlook 
that includes all of their own fellow citizens. What Willkie calls the “mocking paradoxes”213 of 
racism and inequality, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, worked as significant 
political and social barriers to the discourse of globalism.  
  
Conclusion 
 
In his work on rhetorical magnitude, Farrell suggests that questions about how a culture 
emphasizes and prioritizes its attachments and ideas, especially about identity, are questions for 
the realm of rhetorical inquiry, for “there is an unavoidable element of contingency, partisanship, 
and ‘interestedness’ in the very nexus of word and world.”214 In this chapter and throughout the 
project, I demonstrate how globalism worked rhetorically to replace isolationism as the 
predominant America worldview in the WWII era by providing an alternative vocabulary with 
which to describe the postwar peace. Willkie’s book, in particular, as one important landmark in 
the rhetorical history of globalization, detailed an optimistic vision of postwar cooperation in 
concrete and sensory terms that Americans could easily imagine—a can of lunch meat, the 
crow’s feet around the eyes of a kind elderly woman, the friendly faces and strong bodies of their 
own sons, a sheath of golden wheat. By making the world small and familiar, using the strategies 
of ethos, presence, and the compression of geographical space, One World introduced globalism 
into mainstream American public discourse about the postwar world. In a time of epic 
uncertainty, Americans could literally hold the world in their hands.  
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Willkie’s globalist vision of postwar peace depended on trade and international economic 
cooperation, offering an alternative to a discourse of isolationism and national economic self-
sufficiency. It also depended on the support of a domestic and global middle class, for, he wrote, 
“the history of civilization shows that the creation of economic conditions under which those 
who have little or nothing can improve their lot is not a dividing process but a multiplying one, 
by which the well-being of all society is advanced.”215 The following chapter turns to President 
Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights speech, which directly addresses the economic fears and 
concerns of everyday Americans in imagining a global future.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE “ECONOMIC BILL OF RIGHTS” IN FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT’S 1944 ANNUAL MESSAGE ADDRESS 
 
 
 
March 29, 1941: Roosevelt to Willkie, via Western Union telegram: “I am 
grateful for what you did and said yesterday. It helps a lot.”  
  
August 25, 1941, Roosevelt to Willkie, requesting that Willkie speak at the Mt. 
Rushmore dedication, using a theme of “national unity:” “I would be ingenuous if I did 
not also mention that, geographically, this region is really in need of the kind of speeches 
you have been making.”  
 
December 5, 1941, Roosevelt to Willkie, asking that he travel to Australia in 
order to cement wartime relations: “There is always the Japanese matter to consider. 
The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any 
moment….Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter.” 
 
December 10, 1941, Willkie to Roosevelt: “What I am trying to say – honestly, 
but awkwardly I’m afraid, because it is not easy – is this….: If such well meant 
suggestions about me are brought to you, I beg you to disregard them. There is on your 
shoulders the heaviest responsibility any man can carry and I would not add to it in the 
slightest way. Even to volunteer a willingness to serve seems to me now only an 
imposition on your attention. Every American is willing to serve.” 216  
 
 
  
 
The above series of exchanges between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell 
Willkie captures this chapter’s central argument: Whereas Willkie was able to promote an 
optimistic rhetoric of globalism through his status as a well-connected globe-trotting private 
citizen, Roosevelt—constrained both by his disability and by the office of the presidency—
carefully managed the American postwar imagination with appeals to national unity in the face 
of fear and civilizational uncertainty. By inscribing economic security as a constitutional right 
foundational to U.S. identity in a precarious and then-unimaginable postwar world, the 
“Economic Bill of Rights,” a peroration to his 1944 State of the Union address, summarizes 
Roosevelt’s approach to a liberal postwar order. 
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Willkie was reluctant to comply with Roosevelt’s multiple requests that he travel and 
serve the President as a surrogate and personal representative; the two were, after all, political 
rivals. Roosevelt’s people, including FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, monitored Willkie 
throughout both the 1940 and 1944 presidential campaigns as well as during the Lend-Lease and 
One World trips.217 Intelligence from the Roosevelt Presidential Library online files include a 7-
page anonymous letter from someone who dined with Willkie and his New York mistress in 
January of 1941, concluding, “He still strikes me as an unusually honest, attractive fellow, on the 
right side in general, not at all an intellectual, sometimes a bit naïve, but thoroughly admirable 
and likeable.”218 Willkie’s legendary ethos was in fact so valuable that Roosevelt considered 
drafting him as Secretary of the Navy as late as April of 1944. One advisor wrote, “Inside the 
Administration of the war effort, Willkie would be out of political activity. His political activity 
for the President might be misinterpreted; his political activity, should he negotiate with 
[Republican presidential candidate] Dewey, might be harmful.”219 Roosevelt knew how to keep 
his friends close and enemies closer; rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke argued that Roosevelt’s 
physical illness led to “a sharpening of the administrative sense, which is decidedly that of acting 
by proxy.”220 Leaving the optimism and public cheerleading to Willkie, the President’s rhetoric 
of postwar globalism was rather an exercise in the careful management of American fear and 
economic uncertainty.  
That the war and postwar planning era saw a precarious balance between horror and 
hopefulness is not an understatement. Burke’s A Grammar of Motives centered around the 
following question, for example: “To what extent can we confront the global situation with an 
attitude neither local nor imperialistic?”221 Hannah Arendt, who escaped Europe during the 
Holocaust, devoted her life’s work to understanding what she described at the “total terror” of 
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the era. In Origins of Totalitarianism she describes the psychological destruction of the human 
spirit, asking, “What meaning has the concept of murder when we are confronted with the 
production of mass corpses?”222 In Between Past and Future, Arendt captures the notion of 
liminality in the World War II era, describing “the odd in-between period which sometimes 
inserts itself into historical time when not only the later historians but the actors and witnesses, 
the living themselves, become aware of an interval in time which is altogether determined by 
things that are no longer and by things that are not yet.”223 In Fear: The History of a Political 
Idea, Corey Robin, reading Arendt, notes a “genuine optimism” that emerged briefly as a 
response to the uncertainty of the era, only to be overshadowed by Cold War rhetoric.224 He 
argues that fear, in the case of war especially, motivates a society to find a shared identity in 
opposition to a perceived threat; in a second and more insidious form, however, fear works to 
perpetuate “inequities of wealth, status, and power.”225 The Economic Bill of Rights speech 
responded to this kind of nascent, persistent, underlying fear. 
Roosevelt’s globalism was more serious, more restrained, and less optimistic than 
Willkie’s. Throughout the presidency, Roosevelt’s economic and foreign policy rhetoric shifted 
between internationalism and isolationism in careful ways, sometimes taking a hard-line, realist 
approach to foreign policy, influenced by President Theodore Roosevelt, and sometimes an 
international idealism, influenced by President Wilson.226 Mary Stuckey suggests that 
Roosevelt’s postwar vision was that of the American democratic example in a globalized world 
order, a good neighbor in a global neighborhood, “in which all nations would have equal rights 
and equal voices; in which cooperation would replace domination; and in which peace would be 
the rule rather than the exception.”227  
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Before human rights could be extended to throughout the globe, however, Americans 
needed to be assured of their own economic status at home. Earliest drafts of the 1944 State of 
the Union speech included information and statistics that spoke to an American populace that 
would likely have found Willkie’s optimistic and cosmopolitan version of globalism 
incomprehensible: “More than one-fourth of all our young men examined for Selective Service 
were below minimum physical standards. Almost one-third had never visited a dentist,” 
Roosevelt and his speechwriters noted. “Our great nation… must face the fact that more than 
one-half of our people have not attended school after the age of thirteen, that five American 
citizens out of every hundred can neither read nor write, that only one out of twenty have ever 
attended college.”228 These Americans needed somehow to imagine themselves as participants in 
the postwar world—assuming there would be one; the Economic Bill of Rights addressed their 
fears and anxieties.  
Biographer H.W. Brands thus calls Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights “a statement that 
was the most radical he ever uttered—and indeed more radical than any president before or after 
ever uttered.”229 Roosevelt understood that security—freedom from fear, freedom from want—
had to be economic, and it had to be felt at the level of individuals and households. While 
rhetorical critics and scholars of FDR have often noted the President’s use of fear and the 
management of fear as a theme and argumentative strategy that worked constitutively to 
establish American national identity throughout the Great Depression and World War II,230 
scarcely have we considered how the Economic Bill of Rights figured into Roosevelt’s 
overarching attempt to establish a liberal-democratic postwar global order. An exception is 
Jayson Harsin’s “The Lost Histories of American Economic Rights,” written explicitly in 
response to the exigence of the economic collapse of 2008. Harsin compares Roosevelt’s and 
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Reagan’s public proclamations of economic rights, determining that “economic rights is a 
historically empty signifier that marks the rewritable articulations between national economy, 
government and freedom,” especially in times of historical contingency.231 While I agree with 
Harsin’s assessment of economic rights as a discursive resource worth seriously revisiting in 
light of current intersections between government, economy, and individual rights, and while I 
similarly suggest as much in Chapter Five, my purpose in the present chapter is to look closely at 
Roosevelt’s 1944 speech itself in the context of presidential rhetoric as it responded to the 
domestic and global economic and existential fears and criticisms of the war and postwar 
planning era.  
After situating the speech with regard to Roosevelt’s critics and constraints, this chapter 
examines how the 1944 State of the Union in general, and the Economic Bill of Rights 
peroration in particular, used scapegoating to establish a sense of national unity that, in 
Roosevelt’s own words, “transcends” fear and petty politics. The speech deftly acknowledged 
and managed the American public’s fears about the global future and their household lives, 
working constitutively to define life’s basic necessities as human rights. Finally, it positioned the 
era as epochal, urgent, and worthy of Constitutional reform.  
 
Political and Historical Context 
 
By January 1944, Allied forces had won control of North Africa and the Soviets had 
ended the Nazi siege of Stalingrad. June of 1944 would see the Normandy landings, which 
would serve as a turning point in the war in Europe in favor of the Allies. Although the war 
dragged on in the Pacific, although horrendous casualties were yet to occur, and although the 
speed of the genocide of the Jews was ever grimly increasing,232 public attention turned toward 
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planning for a postwar world. The treaties and sanctions following the First World War having 
failed, government leaders, philosophers, economists, and intellectuals attempted to weigh into 
the postwar planning debate before the end of present hostilities—all driven by the unresolved 
question of how to organize an economically viable world peace. Karl Polanyi, for example, 
rushed to finish The Great Transformation (1944),233 concluding that “Every move towards 
integration in society should thus be accompanied by an increase of freedom; moves toward 
planning should comprise the strengthening of the rights of the individual in society.”234 
Similarly, Sumner Welles, who had dropped out of public life in 1940 following a personal 
scandal, emerged in 1944 with a book entitled The Time for Decision, which laid out a postwar 
economic and political strategy.235 Welles, a long-time adviser to Roosevelt on foreign affairs, 
argued that foremost, “the field of foreign relations should be concerned with international 
economics.”236 Echoing Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms agenda, Welles advocated a postwar system 
in which the United States led the way toward democratic governance, for “the ability of peoples 
to obtain freedom from fear and freedom from want is contingent upon their ability to want it 
enough.”237 
In his lectures before and during the war years that resulted in The Children of Light and 
the Children of Darkness (1944) Christian philosopher and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
grappled with and attempted to articulate a hopeful, yet realistic, vision for the postwar world. 
He wrote, “The preservation of a democratic civilization requires the wisdom of the serpent and 
harmlessness of the dove. The children of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of 
darkness but remain free from their malice.”238 Although Niebuhr did not offer prescriptive 
suggestions for a postwar international infrastructure, he cautiously favored a movement toward 
economic collaboration via international institutions, if for no other reason than they symbolize 
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human effort, human striving, for, he states, “the task of building a world community is man’s 
final necessity and possibility, but also his final impossibility.”239  
Another prominent voice—and, like Niebuhr, a foreign policy realist—in elite discourse 
about the war and postwar future was that of Walter Lippmann, who had grumbled in his 1937 
book The Good Society, “I cannot see how any group of officials can decide how a civilian 
population shall live nobly and abundantly.”240 In 1943 he published U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield 
of the Republic, advocating alliances between the great powers and railing against Wilsonian 
idealism: “if we construct our foreign policy on some kind of abstract theory of our rights and 
duties, we shall build castles in the air.”241 A year later, in 1944, Lippmann published U.S. War 
Aims, reviewing again the failures of Wilsonianism and arguing that “the fundamental task of 
diplomats and public men is to conserve what is being accomplished by the war.”242 However, 
neither Lippmann nor Niebuhr, and neither Welles nor Polanyi, spoke directly to Americans’ 
everyday lives in the way that President Roosevelt would need to in order to garner public and 
Congressional support for his postwar plans.  
Roosevelt encouraged widespread debate because the existence of what some scholars 
have called a “loyal opposition” helped to unify the public and keep public discourse and 
democratic deliberation alive. He “sought the appearance of a full and open debate” on Lend-
Lease in 1940-41, for instance, because he feared that the nation would only become further 
divided over foreign policy.243 Lend-Lease represented an economic solution to a foreign policy 
problem; it allowed Americans to discuss the war without what Roosevelt called “that silly, 
foolish old dollar sign,” and thus by logical extension without regard to personal cost.244 
Throughout the war, Roosevelt’s speeches quelled Americans’ economic fears by educating 
them about the world, asking them to take out their maps and globes to follow along with his 
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speeches. 245 As Stuckey has argued about Roosevelt, “In times of national uncertainty, the 
constitutive power of rhetoric becomes all the more evident because during those times 
presidents speak directly to the deeper essence of the polity they govern.”246 Roosevelt 
established an intimacy with the American public that was unlike any president before him, 
reaching into homes and living rooms through the radio with his strong and familiar voice.247 
The 1944 State of the Union speech, building on Roosevelt’s rhetorical corpus, effectively 
offered a liberal postwar economic vision in terms that would make sense to the American public 
and position them as stake-holding consumers within it.  
What would evolve into the Economic Bill of Rights had been in the making throughout 
Roosevelt’s presidency. The success of New Deal policies informed and bolstered economic 
planning prior to and during World War II, motivating the administration to embark on what 
some have called a “‘New’ New Deal.”248 An evolution of the National Planning Board, 
established in 1933 as part of the Public Works Administration, the National Resources Planning 
Board (NRPB) was approved by Congress in 1939 as an agency of the Executive branch. It was 
charged with carrying out a Second Bill of Rights.249 As David M. Kennedy notes, economic 
planning forwarded the progressive idea of “imparting to ordinary Americans at least some 
measure… of predictability to their lives…”250 The NRPB was axed by Congress in 1943; 
although the likelihood of a Second Bill of Rights actually being formally implemented was slim 
or impossible, nothing could prevent the President from speaking it into existence.  
 The 1944 State of the Union was an opportune time to do so. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell 
and Kathleen Jamieson observe, presidents use Annual Messages, or State of the Union 
addresses, to "reconstruct the past in order to forge the future," to “reshape reality” and in doing 
so redefine national identity in moments of crisis.251 Roosevelt’s Annual Messages tended to 
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follow a generic pattern that Campbell and Jamieson identify, starting with a meditation on the 
nation’s values and then moving to assessments of information and policy recommendations, and 
ending with a memorable peroration. The Four Freedoms, for example, served as the conclusion 
of Roosevelt’s 1941 Annual Message. The Economic Bill of Rights section of the 1944 Annual 
Message expounded upon the Four Freedoms and similarly served as an elevating move at the 
conclusion of the speech, adjusting shared values to new circumstances and inscribing them as 
constitutional.  
Because it was an election year, Roosevelt could use occasion of the Annual Message to 
advance his political platform as well, and he wanted to appear vigorous. By January 11, 1944, 
however, President Roosevelt was already gravely ill. He would not die until April of the 
following year at his residence in Warm Springs, GA, but 1944 and 1945 saw obvious dramatic 
health declines and frequent periods of rest. Archival materials related to the 1944 Annual 
Message from the FDR Presidential Library digital collection include numerous early drafts, 
leading to a final, formal copy that was released to Congress at noon that day. Too sick to deliver 
the speech to Congress in person, Roosevelt instead gave a live radio address to the American 
public at 9pm Eastern Time that evening.252 He also had the Economic Bill of Rights section of 
the speech filmed for the newsreels.   
 
FDR’s Critics 
 
President Roosevelt was so trusted and beloved that by 1944, his election into a fourth 
term was almost a given; those who did not support Roosevelt, though, hated him. On both the 
political left and political right, there remained some vocal critics, ranging from conspiracy 
theorists to traditional isolationists to economists and the foreign policy realists mentioned 
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above. Among the isolationists was Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the son of a former 
president, who would become a chief opponent to the Bretton Woods agreements during the 
Congressional debate the following year, examined in Chapter Four. Throughout his time in 
office, Roosevelt was forced to make political trade-offs in order to shepherd his domestic 
programs through recalcitrant members of Congress including Taft and others, which as Robert 
Dallek argues, “ruled out bold initiatives in foreign affairs.”253 Prior to the Pearl Harbor attacks 
and U.S. entry into the war, vast majorities of Americans supported the Neutrality Acts as both a 
commercial and foreign policy stance.254 Vigorous public debate around Lend-Lease, examined 
in Chapter Two, as well as the war itself, largely changed their minds; even so, a number of 
outspoken isolationists still argued that the U.S. could be economically self-sufficient and 
buffeted by its oceans in the case of military threat. 
Right-wing isolationism saw perhaps its most extreme form in the popular figure of 
Charles Lindbergh, beloved pilot and spokesperson for the America First Committee (AFC); at 
its height in 1941, the AFC had nearly a million members.255 It was deeply anti-Semitic and 
racist, however, and, between Lindbergh’s increasingly public and outspoken sympathies with 
Hitler and the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the AFC was soon disbanded. Nevertheless, rumors that 
Roosevelt was becoming a dictator, and even that the Pearl Harbor attacks were a conspiracy to 
bring the U.S. into the war, persisted even into the 1944 campaign.  
The very notion of economic planning, too, was subject to fervent criticism from the 
right. James Burnham offered managerialism as a third way between capitalism and socialism in 
response to postwar fears of mass unemployment and total social breakdown.256 George Orwell’s 
1984 took Burnham’s apocalyptic vision to its plausible end.257 Freidrich Hayek’s dire warnings 
that planning would lead to fascism filled the pages of Readers Digest, LOOK¸ and the Saturday 
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Evening Post.258 A condensed, cartoon version of his Road to Serfdom was sent to approximately 
1.5 million military personnel.259 Inspiring fear that a planned society would toll the death knell 
for individual freedom, Hayek wrote, “Only if we recognize the danger in time can we hope to 
avert it.”260 The idea that a postwar world could be planned at all was met with deep skepticism 
and sometimes total cynicism.  
Others accused Roosevelt of engaging in “secret treaties” in his meetings with Stalin, 
Churchill, and Chang Kai-shek in November and December 1943 in Cairo and then Tehran. 
Dallek notes, “No part of Roosevelt’s foreign policy has been less clearly understood than his 
wartime diplomacy.”261 In the 1944 State of the Union, Roosevelt confronted these critics 
through the rhetorical strategy of scapegoating, which will be discussed below, and he also stated 
directly that there were no “secret treaties” in his summits, that “planning” was not a word that 
Americans should be afraid of, and that a “rightist reaction” was the real threat to national unity. 
He paid attention to his critics. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, critics and isolationists sided with labor leader 
John L. Lewis, who had argued that U.S. entry into the war would “make American into an 
imperialist nation, strengthening the powers of the large money interests.”262 This vein of 
isolationism was deeply skeptical of what other observers call the “business internationalists,” 
the bankers and businessmen who advocated for the free flow of trade and capital across national 
boundaries and held that U.S. economic interests depended upon the global economy.263 
Although Lewis had faded into the background after what amounted to a humiliating public 
temper tantrum in 1940, and although Roosevelt had a good reputation as the “people’s 
president” because of his efforts to address poverty during the Great Depression, there was 
bourgeoning labor unrest throughout the war.264 It would erupt in a wave of strikes in 1945-46. 
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In December 1943, in fact, Roosevelt placed the nation’s railroads under government seizure in 
order to squash an imminent strike; this action infuriated labor.265 The 1943 Christmas Eve chat 
and 1944 Annual Message both responded to this situation by attempting to save Roosevelt’s 
reputation as a friend of the workingman.  
Responding to these critics and to the historical and political context, Roosevelt had to 
find a new liberalism: global capitalism with a domestic safety net. “Liberalism,” as Alan Ryan 
writes, “is best understood as a theory of the good life for individuals that is linked to a theory of 
the social, economic, and political arrangements within which they may lead that life.”266 
Roosevelt performed his liberalism as a tempered and pragmatic rhetoric of globalism that 
dismissed critics and appealed both to foreign policy realism and to the everyday fears of 
Americans.267 
 
1944 Annual Message Radio Address and the “Economic Bill of Rights” 
 
As noted above, the Economic Bill of Rights section of the 1944 State of the Union 
serves as the speech’s three-page conclusion; the first ten pages of the radio version of the speech 
are a truncation of the 1944 Annual Message. Following the generic patterns of identifying 
problems and proposing solutions, as well as establishing national identity via the institution of 
the presidency,268 Roosevelt explains the current moment in terms of the ongoing war effort and 
looks to establish policies that will both end the war and establish a lasting peace. He dismisses 
his critics’ “faulty perspectives,” seeking, like Willkie in Chapter Two, to negotiate the public’s 
understanding of the magnitude of the moment: “The faulty perspective consists in over-
emphasizing lesser problems and thereby under-emphasizing the first and greatest problem.” 
Recalling the “lessons of 1918,” the President decries “over-confidence and complacency” as the 
 73 
 
“deadliest of all enemies.” He then proposes a set of economic policies—a simplified tax code, 
controls on war profiteering, food subsidies, and currency stabilization—to win the war and 
prevent economic chaos. He also offers a version of a national service law toned down from 
previous drafts, drawing on the recommendations of his advisors and promoting a sense of 
national unity and shared values to carry into future generations. The speech closes with a 
statement of rights mimicking the Bill of Rights:  
Among these are: 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries, or shops or farms or 
mines of the nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; 
 The right of farmers to raise and sell their products at a return which will give 
them and their families a decent living; 
The right of every business man, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of 
freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;  
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good 
health;  
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, and sickness, 
and accident and unemployment;  
And finally, the right to a good education. 
All these rights spell security… 269 
 
In the margins of the triple-spaced reading copy of Roosevelt’s January 1944 radio 
address, a shaky hand marks 5-minute time increments (9:05, 9:10, 9:15, etc.) presumably meant 
by the President to keep himself on pace during the 30-minute speech. 270  The first page, a 
special insert explaining the occasion for a prime-time radio address in lieu of appearing before 
Congress, was subject to several drafts and suggestions by speechwriters before arriving on the 
following opening lines:  
Today I sent my Annual Message to the Congress, as required by the Constitution. It has 
been my custom to deliver these Annual Messages in person, and they have been 
broadcast to the nation. I intended to follow this same custom this year. But, like a great 
many of my fellow countrymen, I have had the “flu” and, although I am practically 
recovered, my Doctor simply would not permit me to leave the White House and go up to 
the Capitol. Only a few of the newspapers of the United States can print the message in 
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full, and I am very anxious that the American people be given an opportunity to hear 
what I have recommended to the Congress for this very fateful year in our history – and 
the reasons for those recommendations.271 
 
The stenographer’s copy of the speech, which reviews the places where Roosevelt 
departed from or changed the script, notes that the words “other people” replace “my fellow 
countrymen,” suggesting that the President decided to begin the speech in an even more 
colloquial register.272 In standard Roosevelt fashion, though, the speech would then rise to a 
series of scathing and sharp-tongued crescendos, reminding Americans that their commander-in-
chief—going on 12 years in office at this point in time—was neither friendly nor feeble. Davis 
Houck, writing about FDR’s economic rhetoric early in the presidency, notes, “Roosevelt was a 
chameleon in scotch plaid,” who “skillfully transformed a physical disability into a rhetorical 
strength. He further transformed the ‘scene’ of health and sickness into one of warfare,” building 
economic confidence among Americans by speaking directly—or seeming to speak directly—to 
their individual needs.273 By the time he gave the Economic Bill of Rights speech, Roosevelt was 
master of his craft. 
The analysis below demonstrates how the speech managed economic fear and worked 
constitutively to unite Americans around a postwar national identity within a globalized world; 
however, as Burke wrote about Roosevelt, “a president who would strive to unify a democratic 
nation must not unify it too well.”274 Scapegoating leftist and rightist critics allowed for a 
clarification of the nation’s priorities: to remain vigilant and self-sacrificing in the midst of the 
ongoing war, and to trust that beyond it would be a future of global peace and individual 
economic security. By aligning the historical moment with the nation’s founding and arguing for 
an updated Bill of Rights that acknowledged the pitfalls of a modern liberal economy, the speech 
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allowed Roosevelt to navigate a rhetoric of globalism that was both transcendent and 
constrained.  
 
 
Scapegoating   
 
Burke describes scapegoating in rhetoric as a “ritualistic outlet” that serves to purify a 
society of its “own iniquities,” in order to create a new sense of unification.275 Several scholars 
have noted that President Roosevelt used scapegoating often and memorably in his speeches 
throughout his time in office. Of the first inaugural’s scapegoating of the infamous “money 
changers,” for example, writes Houck, Roosevelt and his speechwriters “had done a smart thing: 
They were giving the people a group to blame, but without naming any names.”276 In this way, 
the very people to whom Roosevelt was referring—bankers, industrialists, and large 
corporations, mainly—could be let off the hook should the President need their support later. 
Halford Ryan explains that Roosevelt’s scapegoating of isolationists in the Arsenal of 
Democracy speech of December 1940 “concomitantly reinforced why one should patriotically 
support him.”277   
Mary Stuckey also implies language similar to Burke’s concept of scapegoating to 
describe Roosevelt’s approach to his critics throughout the presidency, rendering them, for 
example, “beyond redemption” and in violation of the nation’s democratic values.278 Calling 
them “foxes and weasels,” “appeasers,” “cheerful idiots,” and “ostriches” with their heads in the 
sand, she notes, Roosevelt could blame isolationists for national disunity before and during the 
war.279 Stuckey characterizes such phrases as “the invective,” a politically instrumental and 
constitutively effective means by which Roosevelt “all but argued that anyone who opposed him 
was unpatriotic and un-American.”280  
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Roosevelt’s invective, scapegoating-like phrases in the ritualistic occasion of the 1944 
State of the Union speech tend to be pithy and appealing to the ear. He and his speechwriters 
often used alliteration and the repetition of sounds, imagining isolationists as pests scrambling 
around, “circulating constantly” in a “dirty darkness,” referring to “suspicious souls” who 
accused Roosevelt of secret treaties, “spreading suspicion,” “such selfish agitation” that “creates 
confusion,” and warning of a “rightist reaction,” for example. Roosevelt caricatures those 
“…people who burrow through our Nation like unseeing moles, and attempt to spread the 
suspicion that if other nations are encouraged to raise their standards of living, our own 
American standard of living must of necessity be depressed.” Then he goes onto explain the 
opposite argument, that the American standard of living will only be raised when the U.S. 
engages in peaceful economic relations with its neighbors. 
Roosevelt uses scapegoating in the speech explicitly to establish a sense of national unity, 
of individual sacrifice and what Burke called a collectivistic motive. He refers to “pests who 
swarm through the lobbies of the Congress and the cocktail bars of Washington, representing 
these special groups as opposed to the basic interests of the Nation as a whole.” He argues, 
“Disunity at home—bickerings, self-seeking partisanship, stoppages of work, inflation, business 
as usual, politics as usual, luxury as usual—these…undermine the morale of brave men ready to 
die at the front for us here.” Disunity from any side of the political spectrum threatens 
democracy. Worse, he implores in an enthymematic if-then sentence construction, it risks 
fascism: “If history were to repeat itself…”  
The President’s scapegoating, especially early in the speech, both works to reject 
viewpoints that undermine the nation’s war effort and allows him to move toward being able to 
speak directly to the postwar concerns of everyday Americans. “Luxury” and “business as usual” 
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are chosen for ritualistic alienation and, in Burke’s rendering, represent “the iniquities of those 
who would be cured by attacking [them].”281 Treating business and special interests as 
scapegoats was typical Roosevelt rhetoric; it served to strengthen his own reputation as a 
president who had transcended his own familial wealth and privilege and who understood the 
concerns of everyday Americans.  
At the same time, his scapegoating of the very same people he sought to include in the 
nation’s postwar imagination (i.e., “stoppages of work”) was also typical Roosevelt rhetoric. 
Stuckey notes that Roosevelt was more measured in his response to opponents on the left, that he 
“tended to attack them in a sideways fashion through co-option of policy positions and 
conciliations on the basis of general principles.”282 In other words, he was careful not to alienate 
these critics too much. Burke wrote about the era that working-class, “wage-earners” occupied 
“two fabulously different roles: one as an object of great distrust, and even vilification; the other 
as an object of almost abject courtship.”283 Under a “war economy,” Burke explained, workers 
no longer need to be courted and are expected to make individual sacrifices for a collectivist 
motive, “which will be shared by all except the war profiteers and the empire-builders of big 
business.”284 After the war ended, however, as Burke wrote, “was the promise of return to an 
economic order which was already proving unworkable.”285 It was this fear and potential unrest 
that Roosevelt would have to acknowledge in the speech. 
 
Fear management 
 
Having established a sense of unity by scapegoating his critics, and thus establishing the 
public’s trust in its President, Roosevelt was then able to address the ongoing war and uncertain 
postwar future, leading eventually to the argument that life’s necessities should be considered a 
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fundamental, Constitutional right. Making a series of cause-and-effect arguments, he states: 
“Increased food costs…will bring new demands…which will in turn raise all prices of all 
things….Increased wage or prices will each in turn produce the same results. They all have a 
particularly disastrous result on all fixed income groups.” Here Roosevelt maintains a sense of 
urgency and uncertainty, offering an explanation of what could happen should the end of the war 
see massive inflation.  
He goes on to explain who “fixed-income people” are, and why listeners might care 
about them: “teachers, clergy, policemen, firemen, widows and minors on fixed incomes, wives 
and dependents of our soldiers and sailors, and old age pensioners…. They and their families add 
up to one-quarter of our one hundred and thirty million people.” Not only is this a significant 
number of people, but it is a group, Roosevelt argues, not served by special interests in 
Washington and therefore needs to be protected by the federal government. This is, in effect, a 
system of liberal capitalism that Roosevelt imagined for the future. Economic instability and 
fluctuation would be kept in check by a safety net, while, as Alan Brinkley writes, “government 
could stimulate consumption quickly and easily by using its fiscal powers.”286   
Roosevelt also uses metaphors of perspective, vision, and focus to draw a line between 
fear and reassurance in his call for national unity. After caricaturing critics on both the left and 
right as myopic and self-interested, he continues in the same vein, stating that the war will not 
end “with half-an-eye on the battlefront abroad and the other eye-and-a-half on personal, selfish, 
or political interests here at home.” In other words, their vision is dangerously skewed: “It can 
kill American boys.” Similarly, Stuckey has noted how Roosevelt’s use of visual language 
throughout the presidency worked to bolster the federal government and president’s role in 
political, economic, and social reforms.287 Having introduced the element of fear into the 
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American psyche once again, a theme familiar throughout his presidency and one he could 
manipulate masterfully, Roosevelt offers economic stability as the way to regain proper 
perspective, to focus and “concentrate” and thereby find a sense of national unity.  
Roosevelt’s recommendations to Congress call for national economic stability through 
continued price and wage controls that had already been in place under a two-year Emergency 
Price Control Act. Still holding fear and uncertainty just over the omnipresent horizon, he uses a 
conditional if-then sentence structure to argue that “the country might just as well expect price 
chaos by Summer” should such controls fail to be implemented. Countering “unreasonable 
profits,” “exorbitant profits,” “undue profits,” his proposals use a language of moderation: 
“realistic tax law,” “fair prices,” “reasonable floor,” “a ceiling,” and “necessities only.” Although 
this section of the speech outlines Roosevelt’s approach to the national economy for purposes of 
the traditional Annual Message, the turn to life’s necessities, to food and shelter—floors and 
ceilings—and to the “cost of living,” sets up Roosevelt’s conclusion that economic security is an 
individual right, for “freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from want.” 
Perhaps Roosevelt’s physical constraints allowed him to understand fear so exquisitely 
because he knew that life’s necessities could not be taken for granted. Stricken by polio in 1921, 
he was paralyzed from the waist down and was unable to walk or stand without assistance. His 
personal wealth and class status allowed him to access health care, therapeutic activities (e.g., his 
estate at Warm Springs) and custom mobility technologies that would not have been available to 
most Americans. Metaphors of sickness and illness abound in Roosevelt’s speeches about the 
Depression, diagnosing the nation to be in “poor health.” As Houck argues, “here was a 
recovering paralytic, a man many perceived to be terribly sick himself….How else but through 
the body would economic suffering be internalized and understood?”288  
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The Economic Bill of Rights section of the speech thus categorizes “old age, sickness, 
accident and unemployment” as “economic fears,” not existential ones, against which there 
should be adequate social protection. Likewise, the basic need for shelter is defined as a right, 
“the right of every family to a decent home,” as is “adequate food and clothing.” Roosevelt is 
effectively introducing into public discourse Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs from the academic 
discipline of Psychology, which was coincidentally published in 1943: humans must have their 
basic needs fulfilled before they can grow or thrive. That “the right to a good education” is last 
on the list implies a trajectory from physical needs toward personal growth. 
As the memory of the Great Depression still lingered, it was important for President 
Roosevelt to address those basic needs before Americans could imagine themselves as 
participants in a modern postwar economy, whose growth would depend on the American 
consumer’s desire for material goods. Fears about unemployment were high and not unjustified, 
as wartime production had arguably saved the economy from a second depression. Not only is 
“the right to a useful and remunerative job” listed first, but Roosevelt also specifies “in the 
industries, or shops or farms or mines of the nation” as locations for such jobs. Rather than 
leaving “remunerative job” as an abstract concept, the articulation of potential work sites allows 
listeners to imagine their daily lives in those places. Roosevelt also reassures the American 
farmer of the right to “raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a 
decent living.” Given the recent Depression and Dust Bowl, as well as the twentieth-century 
migration from farms to cities, farmers and rural residents might have been among the most 
fearful and skeptical of Roosevelt and the possibility of a postwar globalism. Indeed, this was 
arguably the same population that would take Willkie out of the 1944 presidential campaign.  
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After addressing workers and farmers, Roosevelt slows down his tenor voice as he 
attends to “every business man, large and small,” explaining their right to “trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or 
abroad.” This is classic free trade rhetoric, an intellectual doctrine and discursive tradition that 
can be traced back to the Greeks and Romans and a belief system in which the universal 
brotherhood of mankind will benefit from a global division of labor in which a region or nation 
uses its natural resources and human capabilities as efficiently as possible in order to create as 
much income as possible.289 Dallek maintains that from the beginning to the end of his 
presidency, “Roosevelt saw an unbreakable link between prosperity and peace.”290 Likewise, 
Stuckey writes, “aggression would be less likely, and because trade would proceed peaceably, 
this neighborhood would be universally prosperous.”291 
The Economic Bill of Rights speech is not about globalism per se, because of the 
constraints and critics outlined above. In order to make a case for globalism, Roosevelt first had 
to manage American fear—in Burke’s words, “sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too sharply 
pointed.”292 If Americans felt secure in their daily lives, if their basic needs were guaranteed 
rights, then that vision could be extended outward, for, as Roosevelt explains with yet another 
alliterative flourish, other countries too desire “peaceful progress by their own peoples – progress 
toward a better life.” This idea would become the basis for the U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights. With economic rights positioned as fundamental modern values in a postwar liberal 
society, “all freedom-loving nations shall join together in a just and durable system of peace,” 
Roosevelt states in the 1944 speech. His postwar vision was for a confident and united U.S. 
nation to experience “economic security, social security, moral security – in a family of nations.”  
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Historical Timing 
 
In preface to speech, Roosevelt says the he is “anxious” to share with Americans his 
recommendations for a “very fateful year.” He states that his critics are “laboring under the 
delusion that the time is past when we must make prodigious sacrifices – that the war is already 
won and we can begin to slacken off,” that this is a “dangerous folly” and that the war persists. 
In the next line, he uses distance and perspective to explain the errored thinking that the war has 
already been won, stating that “that point of view can be measured by the distance that separates 
our troops from the ultimate objectives in Berlin and Tokyo – and by the sum of all the perils 
that lie along the way.” Here, Roosevelt uses time and space to reiterate a sense of urgency, yet, 
unlike Willkie’s rhetoric of globalism in which the world was made small and familiar, 
Roosevelt’s world remains vast, dangerous, and difficult. Several paragraphs later, he states, “we 
are going forward on a long, rough road – and, in all journeys, the last miles are the hardest.” 
Americans must remain vigilant.  
Calling attention to the moment as a historical turning point, the President states, “it is 
our duty now to begin to lay the plans and determine the strategy for the winning of a lasting 
peace...” and emphasizing the point by departing from his prepared remarks, “it is time to begin 
plans…” For Roosevelt, raising the American standard of living by ensuring economic security 
for individuals would have the common sense effect of “a better standard of living in 
neighboring countries with whom it trades.” Furthermore, as noted above, it would prevent 
conditions that lead to war: “People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which 
dictatorships are made.” In closing the speech he characterized the moment in terms of kairos, as 
a “critical hour,” a theme that would guide Congressional rhetoric around the Bretton Woods the 
follow year, and that I examine in Chapter Four.  
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By drawing explicitly on the language of the nation’s founding history, Roosevelt’s 
exposition of an Economic Bill of Rights emphasizes the radically contingent nature of the 
moment. Borrowing from the 1776 Declaration of Independence, he begins, “these economic 
truths have become self-evident…” and “inalienable” and goes on to explain that a new Bill of 
Rights is necessary as a “basis of security and prosperity” in the postwar era. While the Bill of 
Rights formally refers to the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the political tradition 
of making demands and grievances by outlining a set of common rights or principles long 
preceded the U.S. Constitution and would continue to influence global political discourse long 
afterward. Early drafts of the 1944 State of the Union are more explicit about the relationships 
between the early Republic and the World War II era, stating that while the Bill of Rights 
addressed political tyranny, economic tyranny would be a barrier to the “pursuit of happiness” in 
the postwar era.293 
Roosevelt effectively updates the Bill of Rights by introducing economic security as a 
“truth” that already “we have accepted.” The small grammatical shift into the present perfect 
verb case—not ‘we should do this’ or ‘we will do this’ but ‘we have already done this’—speaks 
to the constitutive nature of both the Economic Bill of Rights speech in particular and 
Roosevelt’s presidential rhetoric generally. Thomas Farrell noted a similar shift in Roosevelt’s 
declaration of war speech of December 8, 1941, stating that by “refiguring the time sequence of 
decision and action, the president was able to take war outside the realm of deliberation, and 
thereby bring “the audience more directly into the picture as a co-participant” in U.S. wartime 
culture and identity.294 Although Roosevelt continues on in the speech to urge Congress to 
formalize the rights—Eleanor Roosevelt pressed her husband to do so as well—it did not matter; 
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in the rhetorical act of saying that economic rights were human rights they became so, for, as 
Farrell writes, constitutive rhetoric enacts modes of consciousness and affiliations.295   
Roosevelt then extends economic rights to “all – regardless of station, race or creed.” 
This inclusive language built on the Four Freedoms agenda, which Roosevelt had previously 
extended to “every creed and race.”296 Here, he adds “station,” a gesture that acknowledges 
ordinary and working-class Americans’ deep-seated economic anxiety in the face of an uncertain 
global future. At the same time, it indicates an ideologically shifting liberalism during the war 
era that, as Robert P. Saldin argues, eventually moved the Democratic party away from explicit 
populist and class-based rhetoric toward being the part of racial justice and inclusivity.297 This 
shift, however, would not come easily: courting Southern Democrats in an election year, the 
President could not take an activist role in the burgeoning civil rights movement, for example, 
and his own record of Japanese internment and failure to act early enough upon learning of the 
European Holocaust also suggest reasons for the speech’s restraint.  
Roosevelt and the liberal Democrats “came to fully embrace capitalism,” writes Saldin;298 
the Economic Bill of Rights worked constitutively to include poor and working Americans in the 
nation’s vision of postwar globalism. Nevertheless, it required the cooperation of the same 
moneyed interests subject to Roosevelt sharp-tongued scapegoating throughout the presidency. 
Burke wrote about the President’s Depression-era efforts to nationalize power holdings and 
restructure banks that “…he drew upon the government credit, not to introduce a new collectivist 
step (as his ideologists interpreted his moves) but to underwrite the traditional modes of private 
investment…299 Similarly, as Nomi Prins writes with the benefit of hindsight, “More than FDR’s 
New Deal stimulus or the war requirements of hiring people to produce weaponry, it would be 
the propelling of the US bankers into the epicenter of global war financing that would catalyze 
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the US markets.”300 While Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights might have appealed to a large 
swath of the American and world public, globalism left it out. Brinkley, writing about liberalism, 
defines the era as a “brief and admittedly deceptive moment when large numbers of Americans, 
at the close of the most catastrophic war in human history, found it possible to believe that they 
could create a new and better world.”301 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Economic Bill of Rights speech represents a careful and constrained presidential 
response to criticisms and fears about postwar global capitalism. It worked constitutively as an 
inclusive, unifying rhetoric that guaranteed the economic security of all Americans, giving them 
a sense of what Stuckey calls “economic identification,” an understanding of themselves as 
members of a domestic and global community of good neighbors.302 In this way, it marks a 
commitment to American Keynesianism or, to use Kari Polanyi Levitt’s words, of an “implicit 
social contract created by the war that led to the consensus that the first objective of the postwar 
government must be full employment.”303 Institutionally, through the use of fiscal and monetary 
policy, the U.S. government would seek to prevent the economic conditions that lead to violence 
and extremism, domestically via the Fed and internationally via the International Monetary Fund. 
Rhetorically, the 1944 State of the Union Speech used a ritualistic strategy of scapegoating to 
unify Americans around an inclusive postwar national identity. The Economic Bill of Rights 
acknowledged and managed economic and existential fears by drawing on a constitutive 
discourse that links free trade with human rights, placing the historical moment as a critical 
turning point in which economic rights became a salient part of the nation’s foundational 
principles.  
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However, as explained next in Chapter Four, the structural economic reforms that found 
expression in the International Monetary Fund (and IBRD/World Bank) as taken up by the U.S. 
Congress in 1945 were ill-equipped to handle a global economy shattered by war. In a history of 
progressivism and internationalism, Alan Dawley writes that “the prevailing view at the end of 
the war was that the state’s role in economic management should not rest on national planning… 
but on rebuilding consumer markets through counter-cyclical fiscal policies aimed at maintaining 
consumer demand.”304 The 1946 Employment Act would, for many observers, strike a final blow 
to both planning and Keynesianism.305 Amid labor unrest and growing racial tensions, President 
Truman would make it the federal government’s responsibility to maintain full employment, 
largely through measures suggested to the president by a small group of economic advisors—the 
president would be obligated to present an annual economic report to Congress.306 The Council 
of Economic Advisors (CEA) would assist in making policies and suggest compensatory 
spending in order to stave off recession, stabilize prices, and achieve full employment at the 
same time as promoting free enterprise; Ira Katznelson argues that Truman kept the CEA 
deliberately small, as he was forced to bow to southern Democrats on labor and civil rights 
issues.307 And indeed, John W. Jeffries argues, the Employment Act was not actually a 
commitment to employment or conditions of employment; rather, it “was ultimately more a 
symbolic consensus statement of general government responsibility for a stable free-enterprise 
economy.”308  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ABOUT BRETTON WOODS 
 
 
Mr. Tobey: The correct pronunciation is “Bretton”—with a short “e.” Will the 
Senator please pronounce it correctly? It jangles my nerves to hear it called “Bray-ton” 
Woods… 
Mr. Wiley: I am sorry the Senator’s nerves are so tender.309 
 
 
 
By the time Bretton Woods Agreement Act, H.R. 3314, came to a vote on the Senate 
floor on July 19, 1945, after days and weeks of intense debating and sniping, everybody’s nerves 
were jangled. The House had passed the Bretton Woods agreements a month prior, after nine 
tedious weeks of hearings in the Committee on Banking and Currency. During those same nine 
weeks, President Roosevelt had died in office, Hitler had committed suicide, victory had been 
declared in Europe, and the U.N. Charter had been signed just as the Truman administration was 
preparing to use atomic weapons against Japan.   
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, during a historical moment of radical 
contingency and war a constitutive rhetoric of peace through international economic cooperation 
emerged as a way for Americans to imagine the future. By using ethos and presence to 
encourage Americans to re-imagine the size of the globe, Willkie’s optimism about a lasting 
peace sustained by international trade brought globalism into mainstream public discourse. 
President Roosevelt tempered globalism by managing a persistent, underlying fear of economic 
instability among everyday Americans, introducing them to a discourse of human rights that 
guaranteed the necessities of food, shelter, clothing, health care and decent employment. This 
chapter turns to the Congressional debates about Bretton Woods in order to see how globalism 
was cultivated as an aspect of American national identity as well as institutionalized in the form 
of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
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Congressional rhetoric is a unique genre that puts public democratic deliberation into 
practice and also serves the function of making concrete policy.310 As G. Thomas Goodnight 
states, “public policy argument may be understood as a productive, situated communication 
process where advocates engage in justifying and legitimating public interests.”311 He and other 
scholars of Congressional rhetoric have examined the relationships between legislative debate 
and public discourse, demonstrating how legislative rhetoric serves, or fails to serve, democracy 
and the public good.312 Similarly, I draw on the Congressional Record as a site of debate about 
shared American interests and values, in the context of postwar international economic planning. 
Moreover, the Congressional action of passing the Bretton Woods Agreements represents a 
performative speech act that turned globalism from an abstract idea into an institutional 
reality.313  
Offering an explanatory analysis of the arguments used in Congress to debate and 
eventually implement the Bretton Woods institutions, this chapter argues that while both 
supporters and opponents of the Bretton Woods agreements understood the pending moment as 
historically significant, and while both sides sought to explain a global postwar future in terms of 
economics generally and trade particularly, they used competing discourses of expertise to 
warrant their economic claims. Before elaborating the debates around the three major themes of 
kairos, historical argument, and economics, I situate the debates about Bretton Woods as 
political, economic, and historical problems to be solved and also offer some brief background 
about the agreements themselves.   
 
Political and Economic Context 
On February 12, 1945, President Roosevelt made an urgent speech to Congress in support 
of the Bretton Woods agreements, warning that “this point in history at which we stand is full of 
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promise and danger. The world will either move toward unity and widely shared prosperity or it 
will move apart into necessarily competing economic blocs.”314 It was one of the deathly ill 
President’s last major public appearances and, along with the groundwork for United Nations, 
his parting wish for the postwar future. That future, as discussed below, depended on 
international economic stability. To that end, the previous summer, in July of 1944, delegates 
from forty-four nations had joined together at the Mt. Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, to shape a plan for the world economy. For three weeks they slept in hallways and 
linen closets, meeting day and night until finally reaching an historic agreement intended to 
stabilize international currencies and provide a framework for fulfilling Roosevelt’s vision of a 
shared global peace and prosperity.  
Often overshadowed by stories about the war and tales of dramatic topmost diplomacy, 
the narrative of the Bretton Woods institutions and their implementation receives little historical 
attention. Yet, as Ed Conway argues, “the institutions these men and women created… are as 
important today as they were upon their creation.”315 Bretton Woods remains the first and only 
time that representatives from around the world came together to reshape the international 
economy. Delegates knew, as did Roosevelt and Congress, that global civilization stood at a 
precipice. Political and military decisions might bring an end to war, but economic cooperation 
was essential for sustaining peace.  
The decisions made following the First World War and in the interwar decades were 
starting to be seen as mistakes in the minds of global policymakers as well as the American 
public. Relationships between economics and war were also becoming increasingly clear: many 
thinkers and policymakers agreed that the sanctions put in place by the treaty of Versailles led to 
trade wars and currency manipulations, which led to global depression, which led to the Second 
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World War. If there was to be future peace, the argument went, steps toward international 
economic cooperation must immediately be made, before the war’s end. 
The Bretton Woods institutions were debated within an internationalist discourse that was 
informed by Wilsonianism, isolationism, and imperialism. In order to contextualize 
Congressional rhetoric regarding the Bretton Woods Agreement Acts in the summer of 1945, I 
first include a brief discussion of the interwar period as an immediate historical problem to be 
solved. A renewed discourse of Wilsonianism informed discussions about the failures of the 
Versailles Treaty and League of Nations, as well as the Great Depression and U.S. isolationism.  
The World War II era saw a resurgence of Wilsonian idealism in public discourse. As 
Walter Russell Mead states, Wilsonianism carried a religious fervor that appealed widely, for 
“everyone, rich or poor, is welcome to the shelter of the Wilsonian revival tent.”316 The failure of 
the U.S. Congress to ratify President Woodrow Wilson’s plans for a peaceful future following 
the First World War, including the League of Nations, was cause for embarrassment and 
reinvigorated motivation in supporting institutions of international political and economic 
cooperation. J. Michael Hogan, examining Wilson’s 1919 Western Tour to promote the League, 
argues that his rhetoric was too far ahead of popular opinion in his time but that “after World 
War II Wilson’s vision of American internationalism became his greatest legacy.”317 Supporting 
the Bretton Woods institutions meant a symbolic unity around a renewed Wilsonian 
internationalism, however flawed.   
Despite its popularity, the new Wilsonianism of the WWII era was critically aware of the 
problems at Versailles as well as with the League of Nations. The 1919 Paris Peace conference 
had been, as one critic describes, “a hissing snakepit of politicians, all with competing political 
objectives.”318 Mired in political negotiations about sanctions and reparations, leaders failed to 
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address the world’s economic problems. John Maynard Keynes’ Economic Consequences of the 
Peace (1919), a scathing missive arguing that international relations must be viewed through an 
economic rather than political and military lens, written in response to the situation, launched his 
career. Twenty-five years later at Bretton Woods, Keynes was determined not to repeat the same 
mistakes. Eric Rauchway argues that Keynes and Roosevelt worked together to use monetary 
policy to end the war and secure the peace.319 
Even more important than the symbolic failure of the League was the problem of 
repayment of war debts, which had drained the international economy in the 1920s and 1930s. 
World War II era decision makers were starting to understand the Great Depression as a global 
collapse of trade due to arbitrary currency valuations. Fred Block explains that via the New Deal 
policies, the Roosevelt administration opted for a nationalist response to global depression, both 
politically and rhetorically, adopting economic protectionism and foreign policy isolationism. He 
writes, “…it was not simply that the United States failed to lead in tariff reduction in the interwar 
period, but that the United States was a major obstacle to trade liberalization.”320  
Mead also describes a “myth of virtuous isolation” that took hold after World War I, in 
which Americans increasingly believed that the nation had been dragged unnecessarily into war, 
that New York bankers in cahoots with Allied governments had “snookered the United States 
into what turned out to be simply a savage conflict between two bands of imperialist robbers.”321 
As a result, effectively for the next two decades, the American public was bitterly divided 
between internationalism and isolationism. As Susan Dunn writes, “families and friends, 
churches, universities, and political parties found themselves torn apart.”322  
Domestic programs designed to address the Depression in the United States had further 
entrenched isolationist sentiments across a broad political spectrum during the interwar years. 
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For Robert Dallek, President Roosevelt’s choice between domestic and foreign affairs was a 
political trade-off: “Since winning congressional approval for domestic programs essential to 
national economic and political stability ruled out bold initiatives in foreign affairs, Roosevelt 
acquiesced in the widespread preference for a passive foreign policy.”323 With the Neutrality 
Acts of the 1930s, isolationism became synonymous with non-intervention and at the same time 
replaced the causal argument that trade liberalization would lead to peace. That is, “neutrality” 
had previously meant neutrality in commerce—the movement of goods and currency even 
among belligerent nations—and now it became a foreign policy stance as war simmered on the 
horizon. Isolationists believed that selling arms to belligerents would bring the U.S. closer to 
war.324  
As illustrated in Chapters Two and Three, Lend-Lease was important at both the 
beginning and end of the war, bringing the public around to support the war effort in Europe and 
laying the groundwork for the Bretton Woods institutions. As the war was drawing to a close, 
Great Britain knew that Lend-Lease would expire, and because it could not pay the United States 
back for Lend Lease—its debt to GDP ratio at the end of WWII was 240%, for example—
Roosevelt’s administration had to find another option, which was basically to turn postwar global 
economic relations over to the U.S. At the same time Keynes was negotiating the Bretton Woods 
agreements, then, he was attempting to secure a separate British loan, and, as his biographer 
Robert Skidelsky concludes, he died doing so.325  
Another important aspect of the discussion was the U.S. response to the Soviets. 
Roosevelt attempted to leave as his legacy a tenable political and economic relationship with 
Russia through his diplomatic actions at the “Big Three” conferences and in his Treasury and 
State Department staff. Cordell Hull, in particular, feared a return to isolationism after the war 
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and desperately wanted to cooperate with the Soviets.326 Diplomacy with Stalin had been 
precarious all along, of course, but Russia was seen as an untapped market, and the hope was that 
it would, in John Lewis Gaddis’s words, “emerge from the war with an insatiable appetite for 
consumer goods.”327 This hope reflected a certain free trade idealism, to be sure, but it was also 
grounded in the realistic fear that the end of the war could mean a fall back into Depression: 
“Fully aware that the New Deal had not solved the problem of unemployment in peacetime, 
Roosevelt and his associates hoped that foreign markets would absorb the vast quantity of goods 
which would have to be produced if employment levels were to be maintained after the fighting 
had stopped.”328 Indeed, the Bretton Woods institutions assumed that democratic capitalism 
could co-exist with communism so long as currency vacillations were kept in check, the result 
being a peacetime cooperation of nation-states, all on a trajectory toward prosperity. According 
to Dallek, “In the first months of 1945, a majority of Americans shared Roosevelt’s and 
Eisenhower’s hopes for a benign Soviet Union and a world without war. Fifty-five percent of 
surveyed Americans said that Russia could be trusted to cooperate with the United States after 
the fighting.”329 This number would wane significantly in the spring and summer of 1945, as the 
U.S. relationship with Russia soured almost immediately on Truman’s ascent into presidential 
office.330  
In addition to U.S. domestic discourse about postwar international economic cooperation 
and strategic political and economic relationships with Great Britain and Russia, a final 
contextualizing factor cannot be understated: the war itself.  With nearly half a million U.S. 
soldiers killed and countless wounded in the war, Americans understood its human toll if not 
nearly to the extent that citizens in living in areas directly affected by the fighting did. Fear of 
postwar industrial economic fallout for the U.S. was not unfounded. In The Economics of 
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Demobilization, published in 1944, for example, economist E. Jay Howenstine laid bare the 
issues facing the U.S. and global economy after the war. By 1943 fully one-fifth of the country’s 
manufacturing capacity was subject to federal contract, and somewhere around thirty million 
Americans were employed in war production. The role of unions, farmers, minority groups--
African-Americans, Japanese-Americans, the disabled and elderly, and women, especially--in 
the postwar economy was uncertain, as was the fate of approximately twelve million service 
men.331 Comparing the end of the First World War with the ongoing Second World War, 
Howenstine warned, “…there will be some who will advocate the immediate withdrawal of 
government from all economic activity. If such a policy is followed, we will again be thrown into 
a period of planless demobilization with its inevitable consequences of inflation and 
unemployment.”332 Here Howenstine echoed the growing consensus that mistakes made at 
Versailles and Paris led to the Depression, which led to war.  
Important political and economic developments leading up to World War II thus posed 
major questions about global politics and economics facing Congress as it took up the Bretton 
Woods institutions for debate: How do we understand the present moment in light of recent 
national and global history? How can we ensure a system of global economic stability through 
international trade? What is the role of the United States in the new political order? And most 
importantly, how do we prevent the outbreak of World War III? 
 
The Bretton Woods Agreements 
Before examining Congressional rhetoric surrounding Bretton Woods in 1945, some 
additional background about the institutions themselves and the major British and American 
figures involved is in order. U.S. plans for an international architecture that would stabilize 
currency and promote postwar trade officially began in Henry Morgenthau’s Treasury 
 99 
 
Department before Pearl Harbor, though Assistant Secretary Harry Dexter White may have been 
working on them earlier. White and Keynes drafted proposals that were published as the 
American Plan and British Plan, respectively, in April 1943. White and Keyes then began to 
negotiate an overarching plan that could be agreed upon by all nations. In three harried of weeks 
of negotiations among representatives of forty-four nations at Bretton Woods in the summer of 
1944, just as Allied troops landed at Normandy, that is exactly what happened.  
By this time, Keynes was a household name in the United States. His major works, 
Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), Essays in Persuasion (1931), and the General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) had earned him a reputation as the world’s 
foremost economic theorist. A charismatic London socialite and friend of the Bloomsbury group, 
he became wealthy through personal investing. Although Keynes’ personal loyalties were 
unquestionably British, his economic ideas strongly influenced American academics and 
policymakers.333 American Keynesianism was fundamentally a shifting liberalism during the 
Roosevelt presidency, as demonstrated in Chapter Three. John Kenneth Galbraith cites the 
“almost unique unreadablity of The General Theory” for its popularity among American 
economists and policy makers, stating that “as Messiahs go, Keynes was deeply dependent on his 
prophets.”334  Indeed, interpreting and debating Keynes became a pedagogical exercise, 
particularly among young economists, and particularly among those at Harvard in the 1930s who 
would soon come to have an influence in Washington.  
As David Kennedy writes, the New Dealers’ embrace of deficit spending and enthusiasm 
about Keynesian policies, “tolled the knell for an older reform tradition” by trying to “reach an 
accommodation with their traditional nemesis, capitalism. In the process they abandoned the 
strategy of direct governmental interventions to secure equality and protect the disadvantaged, 
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and instead established a new political religion devoted to the god of economic growth.”335 
Patrick Renshaw argues that the U.S. adopted Keynesianism to some extent during the New 
Deal, and even more so during the war, as a practice if not necessarily a principle; that is, “as it 
struggled to end mass unemployment, the federal government stumbled upon this policy, 
whereby it was forced to act as compensating agent during economic downturn, spending public 
money to fill troughs in the trade cycle in order to stimulate revival, then cutting back in periods 
of boom.”336 Through the use of fiscal and monetary policy in order to feed and fuel economic 
growth, then, U.S. postwar policy sought to prevent the economic conditions that led to violence 
and extremism, domestically via the Federal Reserve and internationally via the International 
Monetary Fund.  
White is known as the mastermind behind the Bretton Woods institutions, bringing to 
Morgenthau and Roosevelt a “coherent vision of an internationalized New Deal.”337 A Harvard 
graduate, White took a position at the Treasury in 1934 and worked closely alongside 
Morgenthau as a liberal New Deal democrat within Roosevelt’s administration. Privately, 
however, White was intrigued by socialism and even Russian communism. Due to recent 
declassified information about the war and Cold War, as well as archival research conducted by 
economic historian Benn Steil and others, we now know about the Venona cables and other 
evidence indicating that White provided intelligence to Soviets during the war under the code 
name RICHARD. He tried to offer better loan arrangements and assistance under Lend-Lease in 
order to get Russia to agree to Bretton Woods. Accused of spying for the Soviets, White 
appeared in front of the HUAC in August 1948. His death a couple of days later was cause for 
conspiracy theories as well; opinions about White and the extent of his collaboration with the 
Soviets seem to range from blaming him for the Pearl Harbor attacks to applauding his tireless 
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efforts to establish a postwar peace—even with Russia, and even if it required back-channel 
negotiations.338 
Keynes’s and White’s famously large personalities clashed at Bretton Woods, but the 
general outlines of their plans for a postwar global economy were relatively similar. Both wanted 
an international fund that would stabilize currency and ease balance-of payments woes by 
offering lines of credit. The British did not like the word “stabilize,” so the name of the 
institution changed from the Stabilization Fund to the Monetary Fund. Both plans also included 
an international bank or clearinghouse that would make loans to support reconstruction and 
global full employment. Keynes wanted an international unit of currency tied to the gold 
standard—called, perhaps, a bancor, or unitas—but White wanted the dollar, pegged to gold, to 
work as the baseline for global currency exchange. White’s plan won.  On the one hand, the 
Bretton Woods conference is touted as a historic example of global democratic deliberation. On 
the other hand, some critics argue the U.S. strong-armed weaker countries, especially those in the 
Western hemisphere, into signing the agreements.  
The next step would be to mobilize support for the agreements in order to gain 
Congressional approval. Rauchway argues that the “public meaning” of Bretton Woods was 
more important in the minds of its architects than the institutions themselves, that “the 
requirements of public welfare should drive the value of money, and not the other way 
around.”339 The Office of War Information reported that the American public was apathetic and 
unaware of the conference and agreements, so it started a massive propaganda campaign in the 
spring of 1945 targeting women, clergy, labor, and the elite press, all urging haste. The following 
section considers the common arguments and rhetorical strategies used by the U.S. Congress as it 
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debated the Bretton Woods Agreement Acts and institutionalized the nascent discourse of 
globalism in the era.  
 
 
Rhetorical Strategies in the Congressional Debates  
 
Although Keynes was popular and Keynesianism was already engrained in mainstream 
U.S. economic theory and policy, the discourse of globalism as represented in the Bretton Woods 
institutions was still not a given. Competing economic rhetoric stifled public, presidential, and 
economic discourse about the postwar world. The final chapter of Friedrich Hayek’s Road to 
Serfdom, titled “Prospects of International Order,” is explicitly critical of the attempts by Keynes 
and others to establish a supranational economic authority through the Bretton Woods and UN 
system, for example. He says that their ideas are half-baked, “ambitious schemes,”340 and that 
“planning on an international scale, even more than is true on a national scale, cannot be 
anything but a naked rule of force, an imposition by a small group on all the rest of that sort of 
standard and employment which the planners think suitable for the rest.”341 Even on the issue 
about raw materials and resources, which others wanted to set aside as unique commodities not 
subject to the same market forces, Hayek claims that any attempt at negotiation between states 
will create a competition that will only be won by the most powerful and most armed.  
Indeed, opponents in Congress used Hayek’s language of “scheme,” “very slick scheme,” 
“experiment,” “swindle,” “complicated,” and “uncharted” to describe the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The American Bankers Association (ABA) accused the Fund and Bank of being 
“novel.” John Williams, Vice President of the New York Federal Reserve, polemicized against 
the IMF and proposed an alternative “Key Currency Plan,” arguing that the Fund would not 
work. However, as Fred Block explains, Williams and the ABA actually feared that the Bank and 
 103 
 
Fund would work too well: “They feared that extensive national or international governmental 
intervention would eliminate the role that private international bankers had historically 
played.”342 As it turned out, the Bank and Fund would mostly facilitate private lending anyway, 
serving as a boon for private bankers. Nevertheless, opposition to the agreements came from this 
small but persistent group.  
In fact, the White plan was toned down and an advisory council of bankers was offered as 
a concession to the ABA in order to get the bill through Congress. If the Agreements did not 
pass, Congress would suffer the embarrassment of the League of Nations two decades prior. 
Given the stakes and the experience of immediate history, this was a risk it was not willing to 
take. Therefore, in a performative act that institutionalized the rhetoric of globalism, the Bretton 
Woods Agreements passed: In the House of Representatives, 345 votes in favor, 18 against; in 
the Senate, 61 votes in favor, 16 against. 
The following analysis is organized around three major argumentative themes that were 
used by both supporters and opponents of the Bretton Woods agreements. First, I explain that 
Congress understood its task in terms of kairos, a moment charged with meaning and in which 
war and economics were intertwined. Second, I show how both supporters and opponents of the 
Bank and Fund drew on the nation’s founding and recent history as sources of invention in order 
to accommodate a postwar rhetoric of globalism. Third, I examine how members of Congress 
used competing forms of economic expertise to imagine global trade in an uncertain postwar 
economy. Eventually, these argumentative strategies served both instrumentally and 
constitutively to institutionalize and authorize globalism.  
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Kairos 
 
In classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, kairos is concerned with time and timing 
of actions, decisions, and arguments, working at the level of praxis. In the legislative discourse 
represented by the Congressional debates surrounding Bretton Woods, the notion of time and 
timing was a central point of conflict as Senators and Representatives questioned whether it was 
the right moment to take an action that would shape an unforeseen future, and whether indeed 
the proposed action was the right action. James L. Kinneavy states that “kairos brings timeless 
ideas down into the human situations of historical time.”343 In the case of the Bretton Woods 
debates, similarly to Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights speech examined in Chapter Three, 
kairos forced Congress to make a collective decision about national values in the face of an 
unknowable global future. Establishing the moment as liminal, Congress was searching for ways 
to establish global economic stability and at the same time maintain domestic priorities. It saw 
war and economics as intimately and historically entwined.  
Although both supporters and opponents of the Bretton Woods institutions understood 
the historical moment as unprecedented and epochal, opponents used the uncertainty of the era as 
a reason not to take action. Representative Howard Buffett of Nebraska held up an actual 
mousetrap as he opened his speech in the House early in the debate, using it as a metaphor to say 
that the Bretton Woods institutions were a “a trap baited with American dollars.” He stated: 
“Here is the most intricate international agreement that has ever come before the House of 
Representatives of the United States, and this House in 2 ½ days or 2 days is going to pass on 
that proposal. I declare that is not a deliberate way to pass legislation.”344 Buffett and others cited 
the complexity of the world economic situation, and of the agreements themselves, as reasons to 
delay a decision on the agreements.  
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The idea that Congress was indeed acting too quickly, that the time to act was not right, 
was repeated throughout the debates and especially by the Agreements’ most outspoken critic, 
Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Taft argued that any investment in the Bretton Woods institutions 
was U.S. taxpayer money wasted; he attempted to delay voting, tried to separate the Fund from 
the Bank, and questioned every aspect of the bill as well as its constitutionality as a whole. Taft 
dominated the debate in the Senate for three days, at one point complaining that his feet were 
tired and he needed to yield allocated time to a colleague just to sit down for a while. He 
questioned every detail of the agreements, every statement made by experts and supporters. Taft, 
like proponents of the agreements, certainly saw the war and postwar global economic situation 
as a crisis, an “emergency situation,”345 but he argued that matters of currency should not be 
debated until the world economy returned to something like a normal state: “That is why I say 
action should be postponed. If the world were normal, if there were normal conditions in the 
world, the fund might carry out its purpose…”346 Moreover, he warned, not only will the Bretton 
Woods institutions not solve the present crisis, they might worsen it. Particularly about the Fund, 
he stated, “…the fund is entirely premature… under present conditions we cannot solve currency 
troubles without creating other troubles.”347 In Taft’s rendering, the Bretton Woods agreements 
embraced a vision of the postwar future that could not be contemplated until the current crisis 
had passed.  
Taft’s opponents used an opposite kairotic logic to say that global action must be taken 
immediately, and that such action must be economic. Supporters of the Bretton Woods 
agreements understood the moment as liminal and they persuasively linked their vision of 
postwar peace to global economics by using a vocabulary reassuring in tone: “We are attempting 
to do here what has never been done before, by any body of men or any aggregation of nations: 
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collectively to introduce order and security into the conduct of the world’s trade and 
commerce.”348 Further, they believed that action could not be delayed, as the opportune moment 
would surely pass. Senator Charles Tobey, a Republican from New Hampshire and former 
isolationist, urged Congress to pass the Bretton Woods agreements, arguing, “We have a unique 
opportunity for reaching an agreement now on postwar international monetary policy.”349 Others 
agreed that “…rarely in history has this body faced a more momentous period than we are now 
entering.”350 These members of Congress urged action, recognizing that the conditions for 
making decisions about the institutional architecture of the postwar future were rapidly changing. 
Not only did supporters of the Bretton Woods Agreement want an immediate decision 
about America’s postwar future, but they also wanted it to be a globalist one. They used 
language and metaphors of uncertainty, asking for “assurance in this changing world,” 351 calling 
the present moment an “uncharted sea” 352 and “crossroads in history,” and describing the 
essential question of the day as whether to “expand our thinking and broaden our horizon…”353 
The Congressional debate about Bretton Woods thus reflects a shift in American liberalism away 
from traditional economic populism and toward globalism, recognizing that a lasting peace 
would require international economic cooperation in limiting currency disparities in order to 
support a system of global trade. Further, those economic foundations had to be established 
immediately, before the present crisis passed.  
Although the Bretton Woods debates in Congress were primarily concerned with the 
instrumental effect of institution-building, they also operated at a personal and visceral level as 
decision-makers began to come to terms with the horrifying reality of the war and especially the 
European genocide. In the spring of 1945, several members of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee had traveled to London and then to Weimar, Germany, where they witnessed the 
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remnants of Hitler’s concentration camps. Alongside arguments about financial details of the 
Bank and Fund, then, were testimonials and trauma narratives. For example, after offering a gut-
wrenching account of his tour of Buchenwald with General Eisenhower, Representative Albert 
Rains concluded, “In the light of history, in the light of our own experience and observation, 
think of the awful and terrifying consequences of the failure of these plans for peace.”354 The 
Bretton Woods institutions thus came to stand not only for global economic stability but also as 
insurance against future human atrocities, and the debate set the tone for the U.N. conference that 
was occurring in San Francisco around the same time.  
In sum, both opponents and supporters of the Bretton Woods institutions understood the 
historical moment as emergent and radically contingent, but they disagreed not only about the 
timing of the action to establish international economic institutions but also about the 
relationship of the institutions to a shared vision of postwar peace. By linking the discourse of 
globalism both to economics and war, supporters of the Bretton Woods institutions saw time as 
of the essence: “We may not have again, for generations, the opportunity which will exist at the 
end of hostilities….We can work together on these problems now or we can wait until they have 
become far more difficult and until it is completely impossible to solve many of them.”355 
Kairos, then, served as a warning; even if the institutions were imperfect, failure to enact them 
would result in a future that repeated the irreparable mistakes of the past. In the liminal moment 
of the present, action must be taken.  
Opponents of the agreements also used kairos as a warning; they feared that the Bretton 
Woods agreements were a hasty and ill-considered solution to the world’s economic woes that 
would have negative consequences for the United States: “I think the present proposal has been 
prematurely presented… [by] those who are anxious to give America away on the basis of an 
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hysteria of good will…”356 Recognizing a shared interest in national security and economic 
stability, Taft argued that the Fund “is only another way to lend money all over the world. It is 
not a currency-stabilization fund at all.”357 For him, the crises facing the postwar world were too 
intractable for the proposed institutions to handle: “Currency is only the surface. It is only the 
froth of the actual economic problems of the world.”358 Taft’s House of Representatives 
colleague from Ohio, Fred C. Smith, similarly fueled fears that the Bretton Woods institutions 
would fail to provide stability to the global economy—and he made the argument personal, 
synecdochally portraying Keynes as personally untrustworthy and thus reaching the conclusion 
that the institutions themselves were similarly flawed: “Lord Keynes is in my judgment a very 
dangerous man….I believe the whole business rests on a false foundation and that it lacks the 
integrity that is required to sustain any useful and enduring monetary and financial 
institution.”359 Congress and the public were searching for stability in a time of chaos, but 
whether the Bretton Woods institutions would solve or worsen the problems faced by the nation 
and the world remained a point of controversy.  
 
Historical Argument 
Supporters and opponents of the Bretton Woods institutions both also used arguments 
from history in inventing a rhetoric of globalism that served to establish a sense of national 
identity in response to the immediacy of the era. Using the nation’s founding and the interwar 
periods as sources of argument, each side envisioned varying roles for the U.S. in an 
interconnected postwar economy.   
Understanding the present moment with regard to kairos, supporters and opponents of the 
Bretton Woods institutions compared the Congressional debate to the nation’s founding history. 
Seeing the occasion as a momentous opportunity to renew the nation’s democratic preeminence 
 109 
 
in a troubled world, one Representative noted, “a great deal has been said about the views of 
Washington and Jefferson, two of the founding fathers of the United States. When they found 
themselves at the crossroads of history, they did not hesitate to take a new and untried way to 
open to the peoples of this country the greatest and most liberal democracy of all time.”360 Others 
traced the wisdom of recently-replaced Treasury Secretary Morgenthau through a list of great 
Americans: “It is the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, of Andrew Jackson, of Abraham Lincoln, 
of Franklin Roosevelt, of Harry Truman. These men knew the people. They trusted the reasoned, 
informed judgment of the people. And so does Henry Morgenthau, Jr.”361 Still others used 
historical argument as precedent for the dollar’s role in stabilizing the national and global 
economy: “In the early days when money was first being discussed by the Colonial Congress, the 
Congress under the Confederation, and the United States Congress, the dollar was the first unit 
of currency…”362  
Historical argument was also used against the Bretton Woods institutions as well. 
Representative Smith invoked Thomas Jefferson to say that a balanced budget should be 
prioritized over foreign investment, stating, “I believe in a balanced budget and the kind of 
government Thomas Jefferson believed in….These are the principles upon which I take my stand 
against this scheme.”363 Thus, while some used the nation’s founding to understand the Bretton 
Woods debate as epochal and the shift toward globalism a natural next phase, others invoked 
history to warn that globalism meant a threat to the nation’s economic foundations.  
In addition to the nation’s early history, both supporters and opponents of the Bretton 
Woods institutions also sought to conceptualize the recent history of the interwar years in terms 
of global economics. For example, Senator Robert Wagner opened a floor speech by stating, 
“…since the projected institutions can be fully understood only in the light of experience, it 
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seems appropriate at the outset to recall some of the world-wide monetary and financial 
problems of the 1920s and 1930s.”364 As Congress debated the Bretton Woods institutions, 
members often cited the First World War and its immediate aftermath as a cause of the current 
crisis and pressing reason for international economic cooperation: “If we had adopted proposals 
like this after the last war it is unlikely that this present war would have occurred.”365 
Congressional failure to ratify Wilson’s League of Nations in 1918 hung as a specter in 1945, 
and many were determined not to reject the latest architecture of international cooperation—in 
the form of Bretton Woods, and also the United Nations—on the grounds that it was a symbolic 
gesture and rejection of isolationism.  
Nevertheless, Wilsonianism’s renewed popularity in public and Congressional discourse 
in the World War II era was not without criticism. Perhaps more important than the failure to 
support a League of Nations was a growing consensus that the Paris Peace Conference and 
Treaty of Versailles not only failed to prevent further war but also may have fueled it: “When 
President Wilson was at the peace conference, things did not turn out satisfactorily even there,” 
states one Congressman.366 Without equivocation, states another, “When the guns became silent 
on November 11, 1918, the world celebrated because it thought peace had come. No greater 
mistake was ever made.”367 In an emotional speech given while still reeling from the recent death 
of his son serving in the war, another blames economic policies following the First World War 
for the Depression and, eventually, the current war: “Helping Europe in a proper manner would 
have been well, had we not erected tariff walls so that they could not…repay the war debts and 
postwar debts. To think what our soldiers now dying lacked in childhood because of this 
blundering makes me so blinding mad I cannot see…God help us.”368   
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Congress also talked about recent history in economic terms; however, whereas 
opponents fixated on how loan defaults affected the U.S. economy, supporters used interwar 
history as a constitutive resource in the rhetoric of globalism. As an example of the former, 
Representative Jessie Sumner of Illinois, after explaining her argument that loose lending after 
World War I caused defaults and led to domestic inflation, challenged listeners, “In that 
depression soldier boys sold apples. Remember?”369 Senator Taft also encouraged Congress to 
draw its conclusions from recent economic history: “…as we learned in the 1920s. We loaned 
and loaned…. We could not continue to lose money. That threw the export industry out of gear, 
and increased unemployment in 1930 and 1931.”370 For Taft and Sumner, the Depression 
especially served as a warning to Americans; they suggested that the Bretton Woods institutions 
were an attempt to use the money of U.S. taxpayers for foreign loans that would likely default, 
causing the U.S. economy to fall back into depression again.371 
Supporters of the Bretton Woods used the recent history of the interwar period and 
Depression to explain the present crisis as economic, and to thus argue that the international 
economic cooperation embodied in the Bretton Woods agreements was necessary for 
establishing a postwar peace: “The 1920s and 1930s should have taught us that we have a choice 
only between economic warfare and economic international cooperation.”372 “One of the great 
lessons that we as a Nation have learned in recent years…policies colored by political and 
economic isolation are not only bound to fail, they are bound to end in disaster.”373 Similarly, 
underscoring his personal change of heart, Senator Tobey stated, “for two decades between the 
great wars we proceeded on the principle that what a country does in connection with 
international monetary and financial problems is its own business. We have tried that method 
and we have found that it leads to anarchy and disorder.”374 Both supporters and opponents of 
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the Bretton Woods institutions thus attempted to draw from lessons learned after the First World 
War, and both tended to agree that defaults on loans and war debts contributed to global 
economic instability. However, while opponents of the institutions used this history to explain 
and warn against U.S. depression, supporters took a global perspective.  
The shift toward a rhetoric of globalism became explicit as Congress debated the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the context of recent history. For example, introducing the bill for 
consideration in the House of Representatives, one Congressman stated, “When the depression 
came in 1929, a world depression, not a depression solely confined to the United States…”375 
Another paraphrased, “The chaotic financial conditions which occurred in this country after 1929 
may be traced in part to the financial disorders in Europe and elsewhere.”376 Similarly, the 
Report of the Committee on Banking and Currency, which was reprinted in the Record as 
introductory material for the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, explained that global depression led 
countries off the gold standard, which led to practices of currency devaluation and 
discrimination, which led to an economic warfare that preceded military warfare, concluding that 
“unless steps are taken to assure international cooperation, these same practices are likely to 
reappear after this war.”377 Globalism, then, was presented as the only option; the nation’s 
founding and recent history were used as constitutive resources in imagining a future peace 
based on global economic cooperation. Supporters of the Bretton Woods institutions understood 
war as economic and economics as global.  
Still, some opponents revealed extreme viewpoints in their rejection of this vision, 
fearing that economic ties to other nations would cause the domestic economy—and U.S. 
founding principle of independence from colonial rule—to suffer: “This is forcing the American 
people to pay tribute to foreign governments. It will make the American people, the American 
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taxpayers, the economic slaves of foreign governments.”378 “I do not want to see anything done 
that will drag us down to the point where we will wreck our Nation in order to do something to 
try to build up other countries and which may ultimately destroy us.”379 “…I am not in favor of 
destroying the United States of America and giving away her resources.”380  
Embedded in these arguments is the same entrenched xenophobia that, as I indicated in 
Chapters Two and Three, was a major underlying factor in both Willkie’s and Roosevelt’s 
rhetorical approaches to postwar globalism. As Ira Katznelson and others have argued, the U.S. 
postwar domestic economy and, by extension, postwar global capitalism was built on segregation 
and systemic racism.381 Roosevelt was too politically restrained to confront what Willkie took as 
a moral imperative to address racial disparities and embrace ethnic diversities, domestically and 
globally. An example of the insidious slippage between race and poverty that persists in 
American discourse about economics can be found in a remark by Representative William 
Lemke of North Dakota: “We will never consent to bring our standard of living down to the level 
of the Latin American peon, the oriental coolie, or the untouchables in India.”382 In another rant, 
the same Congressman revealed his anti-Semitism, stating, “The Bretton Woods Conference 
labored and brought forth twin octopuses—international octopuses designed to suck the lifeblood 
and energy out of the American people. Secretary Morgenthau and his special assistants…are 
sort of stooge daddies to these ugly, un-American twins.”383 Although the rhetoric of globalism 
could allow many Americans to imagine themselves, and the nation, as participants in a peaceful 
postwar global economy, it could not transcend a still powerful strain of provincialism and 
outright racism.  
Supporters of the Bretton Woods agreements thus proceeded with caution. Recognizing 
that “when this war is over, we shall be the greatest producing Nation in the world,” there 
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nevertheless remained an air of reluctance as the U.S. emerged as the world’s dominant 
economy.384 One Senator stated, “…many of our allies seem to think that our own strength is 
inexhaustible. It is not…”385 Another asked, “If we do not carefully guard our own strength, what 
position will we be in if plans fail and another war should occur in the course of time?”386 
Although the rhetoric of globalism offered an appealing vision of long-term peace through 
international economic cooperation in a time of radical contingency, it fell short of fulfilling a 
coherent and shared sense of national identity strong enough to withstand political mistrust and 
persistent fears of war and economic uncertainty.  
 
Economic Arguments 
 
Supporters and opponents of Bretton Woods invoked various forms of technical and 
practical expertise to warrant their claims about the principles and practices of a global economy 
based on free trade. Knowing that time was of the essence, they used historical arguments to 
suggest that war and economics were intertwined and that a peaceful future would depend on 
global trade. As shown in previous chapters, one of the elements of global optimism during the 
World War II era’s revival of Wilsonian internationalism was a faith or belief that trade 
liberalization, the loosening of barriers to the exchange of goods, services, and currency across 
national boundaries, would ensure a long-lasting peace.387 The free trade argument, which James 
Aune, M. Lane Bruner and others have argued is in and of itself a rhetoric, or, as Jasinski might 
call it, a performative tradition, remains a particularly potent one in the post-Cold War era of 
globalization.388 It was influential in the Congressional debates about Bretton Woods as well; 
Barry Eichengreen argues, in fact, that the trade platform of the Bretton Woods agreements 
served to convince Congress of their necessity more so than the monetary aspects.389 The Bretton 
Woods agreements had much more to do with international investments and payments, and with 
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re-establishing something like a gold standard by pegging international currencies to the dollar, 
than they did with free trade.390 Nevertheless, the notion that more trade—assumed to be a 
shared universal moral or value391—would mean less war provided motivation for the 
institutions.  
Trade orthodoxy was not to be questioned, and it was a point of agreement between both 
supporters and opponents of Bretton Woods. In a pointed exchange in the House, Representative 
Charles Robertson asked Representative Brent Spence, “Does the gentleman agree with me that 
if we are to have postwar world prosperity then we must have international trade?”392 He 
answered in the affirmative. Senator Taft also used free trade as point of agreement in the Senate 
debates, stating, “I think we are entirely agreed that we desire to restore international trade 
everywhere.”393 Senator Tobey, too, argued that “…a revival of world trade is essential if 
political, social, and economic order is to be maintained in the world.”394  
Others probed the assumption that trade would lead to peace. Senator Wiley stated that 
too much weight was given to the notion of free trade as a means to peaceful relations between 
nations: “I refer to the matter of foreign trade. We have made a fetish of it.”395 Still others 
acknowledged the imperial and protectionist policies of nations that purport to advocate a system 
of free trade: “…although peace-loving governments have repeatedly declared themselves in 
favor of liberal trade relations and against discriminations, world trade today is 
discriminatory.”396 In debating the Bank and Fund, Congress was also engaged in the larger 
question about how postwar globalism squared with American economic ideals within the 
context of a shifting domestic liberalism, as examined in Chapter Three.  
The Bretton Woods moment saw the fall of British Empire and the rise of what some 
have called twentieth century American imperialism. Liah Greenfeld argues that Smith’s Wealth 
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of Nations was so widely influential not because it advanced a liberal doctrine of free trade, but 
because it explained the curious success of the British Empire with refreshing philosophical 
rationality.397 In his Imperialism of Free Trade, similarly, Bernard Semmell delivers an 
impossibly detailed account of how Pax Brittanica emerged from a series of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century philosophical and political arguments that eventually led to England gaining 
the status of “Workshop to the World.”  Its greatest strength was industry and manufacturing, 
and developing beyond subsistence to emerge as “the center of cosmopolitan international 
economy” meant establishing markets for industrial goods. In short, free trade was historically 
about empire.398 As the British empire crumbled in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
world economy in shreds, a new form of empire—what Ellen Meiskins Wood calls a U.S.-led 
“empire of capital”—shakily emerged, and with it a wave of arguments about free trade. For 
Wood, there is no such thing as free trade, only “the careful control of trading conditions in the 
interest of imperial capital.”399  
Related to trade, then, the second major economic principle discussed in the Bretton 
Woods debates was global capital vis-à-vis the gold standard. Both supporters and opponents of 
the Bretton Woods institutions understood that abandoning gold during the 1930s had worsened 
global economic and political instability, but they disagreed as to whether and how to return to 
something like a global standard. Historically, gold had served as a means of global economic 
self-readjustment—when reserves were moved out of a country, prices would fall, thus making 
goods cheaper and incentivizing more trade. However, the business of actually moving gold 
from one country to another is not efficient, and therefore central banks began to pre-emptively 
raise and lower interest rates to slow and speed the economy.  
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The proposed International Monetary Fund would stabilize the economy by establishing 
the U.S. dollar, pegged to gold, as world currency; it would also create institutional oversight in 
order to prevent dramatic currency fluctuations. For supporters of the institutions, this approach 
made sense: “I say we are doing away with the old gold standard. But we still have a gold 
standard.”400 For opponents, it reeked of state control. Representative Smith, for example, 
echoed the fears of Hayek and the American Bankers Association by maintaining that the Fund 
complex scheme to abandon gold. He states, “Yes; I am old fashioned enough to believe in the 
gold standard, which only means that I believe in liberty and am against slavery—that prices 
should be made in the market and not by the state.”401  
 Both supporters and opponents of the institutions dealt with complexity and uncertainty 
by relying on competing discourses of expertise and by using commodities and currencies to 
concretize abstract theories of free trade and the gold standard. With the postwar period seeing 
the advance of Keynesianism and expert economic models for creating and sustaining prosperity, 
and with the rise of economics as an academic discipline, the very notion of what constitutes 
‘expertise’ was at stake. In The Rhetoric of Expertise, Johanna Hartelius describes expertise as 
rhetorical; that is, an expert not only possesses certain technical knowledge or experience but 
also uses that knowledge within a persuasive transaction.402 In the arguments about Bretton 
Woods, expertise was mobilized as both sides attempted to explain and predict the implications 
of the institutions in the postwar economy. Expertise became part of the public discourse about 
globalism via the debates.  
As explained above, the Bretton Woods Agreement Act underwent weeks of committee 
hearings in the spring of 1945 before being brought to the House and Senate floors. The 
proposals themselves had been debated by so-called economic experts and the public prior to the 
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Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, at the conference, and after the conference. They were, 
as one lawmaker put it, “not the brain children of long-haired, guess-work amateur diplomats.”403 
Nonetheless, opponents of the agreements used the idea of experts and expertise to cast doubt 
about them. One Representative stated, “I know at least two experts in Chicago with whom I 
have checked this who did not appear before the committee.”404 Senator Taft suggested, “The 
truth is, there are very few experts on this subject.”405 Others held up their own experts to 
interpret and explain the Agreements as related to the matter of the gold standard: “I have quoted 
from two or three authorities to the effect that this Bretton Woods proposal is a trend, or a 
tendency, to go off gold.”406 
A faith in experts was also reflected in the arguments made by supporters of the 
institutions. Senator Fulbright, responding to Taft, identified expertise as a point of controversy: 
“The Senator from Ohio asks us to disregard the testimony of the experts…”407 Indeed, both 
supporters and opponents relied on experts to explain and understand the complex details of the 
agreements. Emphasizing kairos and the importance of the moment in establishing a postwar 
peace, Representative Spence stated, “While the people of America do not understand the 
technical details, in their hearts all of the men and women of the liberty-loving nations of the 
world hope that we may do something to prevent future wars, for the next war will be so 
indescribably horrible that no man living can envision it.”408 On the one hand, then, the argument 
was that the details should be left to the experts. 
On the other hand, some supporters of the agreements argued that the American people 
were the experts. The economic principle of the individual profit motive is used to support the 
idea that free trade means peace, for example: “If [peace] is to endure, it must be…a result of 
sensible arrangements that take into account the individual’s urge constantly to improve his 
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standard of living through increased production and expanding trade.”409 In other words, the 
Bretton Woods agreements could be understood by experts and non-experts alike: “The humblest 
worker in the land can understand that such goals, if reached, will assure more employment for 
him and his fellows in the mills and factories. For the farmer, it holds out hope for the disposal of 
crop surpluses…”410 Moving toward an ad populum argument in which expertise lies in the 
wisdom of everyday Americans, Representative Helen Douglas stated, “Every woman is both an 
economic expert and a military expert…It is therefore natural that the women of America are for 
Bretton Woods.”411 Similarly, Representative Hugh De Lacy stated, “I heard to the same purpose 
from trade associations, citizens’ associations, several strong labor unions, the Washington 
Pension Union, and many other organizations and informed individuals.”412 Senator Tobey, 
likewise, introduced and chronicled permanently in the Congressional Record a list of 108 
organizations and constituencies supporting the Bretton Woods institutions. For these legislators, 
Congressional action should reflect the will of the American people; if Americans support the 
institutions, then the bill should pass.  
Because of the assumption that anybody—expert and non-expert alike—can understand 
the basics of trade, illustrating the economic complexity of globalism in terms of commodities 
was a rhetorical strategy often used in the Bretton Woods debates. One Congressman stated, for 
example, “Perhaps the term ‘world trade’ sounds a little remote. Let us narrow the field of 
discussion; let us see what world trade means in terms of domestic industry and 
agriculture….This awareness is nothing new for the cotton growers of my State [Georgia], the 
wheat growers of Kansas, or the tobacco growers of North Carolina.”413  
In another exchange, explaining the necessity for global currency stabilization, Senator 
Elmer Thomas held up paper money and quizzed Senator Taft: “I have here a sample of a 
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number of currencies with which the fund will deal—quite a handful of them. I am going to ask 
the Senator what these currencies are worth.”414 Taft, of course, could not guess the dollar value 
of each ruble, lira, peso, yuan, and krone; he concluded that the problems facing the world 
cannot be understood in terms of currency anyway, and that in buying into the Fund the U.S. 
“will just pour $6,000,000,000 down a rat hole.”415 Thomas ended the exchange by stating, “I 
challenge any Member of the Senate to take this pile of bills, which is worth on its face 
700,000,000 in the currencies of the various countries, and go downtown in Washington and get 
his shoes shined with this whole bunch of bills…”416 His argument was that unless paper money 
is tied to some common global standard of value, it was meaningless. 
By explaining economic complexity and abstraction in terms of commodities and 
currencies, there was also a shift away from isolationism and toward globalism: “All along we 
had assumed that the United States was self-sufficient; that, although the nations of the world 
needed us, we did not need them. The outbreak of war dispelled that illusion forever. We had no 
quinine, no rubber, no tin…”417 In seeing the how the U.S. economy is related to the world 
economy, an unresolved class tension emerges. That is, as Catherine Caufield would later write 
about the Bretton Woods institutions, matters of currency valuation tend to affect only those in 
the upper echelons, the global investment class, whereas commodities are the lifeblood of the 
American working class and global poor.418 To put commodities and currency into the same 
conversation is a recipe for confusion and conflict.  
Proponents of the Bretton Woods institutions saw an opportunity for both the U.S. 
working and investment class to provide materials and goods for postwar reconstruction: “Labor 
they have in plenty. But locomotives, steel, rails, power generators, mining equipment, and 
agricultural machinery—these and many other items they will have to buy abroad.”419 However, 
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others feared that globalizing capital would displace American workers: “It will do the common 
people of America exactly no good at all to have American capital own plants, factories, and 
mines in foreign countries, thus putting itself in a position to undersell its own workers here in 
the United States.”420 Therefore, as the conversation turned from abstract economic principles 
such as free trade and the gold standard to the practices of producing, manufacturing, and 
transferring tangible commodities, there emerged a conflict and question about whose class 
interests were being served.  
This historical irony is that both supporters and opponents were somewhat mistaken 
about the consequences of the Fund and the fate of the gold standard. As Block notes, the global 
economic idealism institutionalized in the Fund “ultimately served to strengthen the business 
internationalists” imposing “the deflationary discipline of the gold standard” onto weak 
economies that could, in turn, be exploited for their cheap labor.421 Even though the bankers and 
isolationists opposed the Bretton Woods institutions on the grounds that they would somehow 
restrict American freedom to pursue life, liberty, and happiness, it turned out that the institutions 
would end up facilitating a world-wide system of imperial capital that nicely served the interests 
of the U.S. business and banker class.422 Further, the Bretton Woods institutions did little to 
instrumentally advance a rhetoric of globalism that supported an internationalist vision of shared 
prosperity and economic security. Nomi Prins writes, “despite their ‘international’ monikers, the 
World Bank and IMF disproportionately served the interests of the Western European nations 
that were most important to the United States from the get-go. The bankers could exert their 
influence over both entities to expand their own enterprises.”423  
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Conclusion 
 
The Bretton Woods Agreements were ratified by Congress, but it was clear right away 
that the institutions could not handle the reconstruction of the world economy. Fred Vinson, who 
replaced outgoing Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, expelled New Dealers from the Treasury as 
diplomatic relations with Russia quickly deteriorated under Truman. Russia came close to 
passing the Bretton Woods agreements but Stalin wanted to keep gold and domestic economic 
information private. The decision not to sign onto Bretton Woods was “the first substantial 
diplomatic fissure between America and the Soviet Union.” Some call it the beginning of the 
Cold War. 424 
Phase III of Lend-Lease came with end of war in Europe, bankrupting an already 
bankrupt Britain.425 Keynes traveled to Washington in September 1945 to negotiate a British 
loan, and the American public was strongly against this idea. He had mild heart attack while in 
the U.S. on October 7, 1945. Bretton Woods hung in the balance as White and Keynes continued 
to negotiate, effectively about dismantling the British Empire by turning sterling area debt over 
to the United States. The Bretton Woods Agreements were debated in the House of Commons 
and House of Lords in December 1945, against a December 31 deadline. Over the next few 
months it became increasingly clear that the Bank and Fund were going to work primarily in the 
U.S. interest. After some final negotiations with White in March 1946 in Savannah, GA, Keynes 
collapsed on a train and soon thereafter died at his home in Sussex, England on Easter Sunday 
April 21. 426 
The Bretton Woods institutions did not fulfill White’s intentions, either. The IMF began 
operations on March 1, 1947. White resigned on March 31. The Fund was already running out of 
money, and countries that had indicated they would make their currencies convertible within five 
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years invoked their right not to do so. White testified before the HUAC on August 13, 1948, 
collapsed on the train home, and died two days later.  
The Bretton Woods system ended officially in 1971, when President Nixon floated the 
gold standard. The World Bank and International Fund maintain operations, but the Bretton 
Woods system is long dead.427 Steil argues that White was wrong about the viability of a system 
in which global trade was dependent upon a gold-backed dollar: “The United States could not 
simultaneously keep the world adequately supplied with dollars and sustain the large gold 
reserves required by its gold-convertibility commitment.”428 In hindsight, what economists call 
the Triffin dilemma killed the Bretton Woods system, as the long-term global commitment of the 
dollar was incompatible with short-term domestic deficit requirements. As Steil notes, “the 
United States is ultimately damned if it meets the world’s liquidity requirements and damned if it 
doesn’t—as is the rest of the world.”429 
Nonetheless, at the time the Congressional debates about Bretton Woods marked a 
hopeful attempt to make the world economy work better. This chapter has demonstrated that 
Congress was aware of this at the time, and that timing, or kairos, was of the essence. It has also 
demonstrated that by linking economics and war, and by drawing on history as an argumentative 
strategy, Congress developed a constitutive rhetoric of globalism. For although the Bretton 
Woods institutions instrumentally failed, or failed to live up to their promises, they constitutively 
succeeded as landmark historical moment in which the rhetoric of globalism was 
institutionalized via a performative government act. It was also a remarkable instance of 
legislative discourse, of sustained and careful debate about the national past and global future. In 
an endearing side exchange about allocating time for debate about the Export-Import bank, 
Senator Barkley said to Taft, “I may be a little optimistic. The Senator from Ohio is always 
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pessimistic. I will compromise between his pessimism and my optimism.”430 The Bretton Woods 
debates set a precedent for how America’s role in the global economy is discussed to this day.  
Still, questions about domestic and global inequality, the nature of industrial democracy, 
and national and collective security remain. By way of conclusion, the following final chapter 
turns to those questions. For we have seen in the twenty-first century what Congress anticipated 
in 1945: “When people are given the opportunity of earning an honest living, of exchanging the 
results of their toil with others, they are not going to surrender these privileges to follow false 
doctrines; but if they do not have a chance to earn those things which are necessary for a 
livelihood, they are bound to resort to anything that promises relief.”431 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
   
The World War II era saw a constitutive rhetoric of globalism emerge in response to deep 
uncertainty about the postwar future. Globalism offered a vocabulary for describing the historical 
moment, as it unfolded, as a turning point in American and world history. Linking free trade with 
global peace, and economic rights with human rights, it seemed a plausible and rhetorically 
powerful alternative, both to the isolationism in American public discourse that preceded the era 
and to the Cold War divisiveness that would replace it. It offered hope during an ominous time 
and a set of values that prioritized human social and economic interconnectedness and 
interdependence over war, imperialism, and profitmaking. It invented an alternative route to the 
future, what David Zarefsky has called a rhetorical “road not taken.”432 
Globalism’s constitutive effects remain relevant in our current era of soaring American 
domestic and global economic inequality. As Judy Holiday has written about ethos in a time of 
invention, “late market capitalism adheres to and relies upon the preeminence of self-interest…. 
To overlook the power of discourses that advocate the private pursuit and achievement of 
professional and material objectives at the expense of others gravely denies the material and 
psychic value conditioning of many of our primary and secondary discourses.”433 In other words, 
if rhetoric about economics in our current era of neoliberal globalization matters, if how we talk 
about ethos and shared values matters, and if how we act upon those values in our everyday 
decisions matters, then we need to be guided by a different set of historical landmarks.  
For the post-Cold War era of economic globalization has seen the unleashing of global 
capital flows through neoliberal policies designed to boost corporate profits by greasing the 
wheels of trade, at the same time threatening public safeguards, quashing wages and worker 
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rights, and creating what Sherrod Brown calls “a vast gulf between those who reap the rewards 
and those who are left with none.”434 The Institute for Policy Studies notes that although abject 
global poverty has decreased since the turn of the millennium (to 15% of the world’s population 
living on under $2/day from 30%), over 70% of the world’s adults still own less than $10,000. 
Meanwhile, a handful of global billionaires are worth more than the annual GDP of most nations. 
Within the United States, the wealth gap is twice as wide as that of other industrialized nations; 
the top 5% of households own more than 90 times that of a median U.S. family.435 In 2016, a 
presidential election year, class—and by extension race and racism—dominates campaign 
rhetoric in both major parties. Statistics and stories about wealth, poverty, trade, and income 
inequality can be found in news headlines daily. “Market idolatry,” as Kevin Phillips argues and 
I would echo, has not only caused this state of economic affairs but has also served to “displace 
the founders’ republican arena of civic virtue and political engagement with the marketplace of 
economic self-interest.”436 Unfettered capitalism undermines democratic values and undercuts 
human rights.  
In reviewing landmark features of the World War II era rhetoric of globalism, then, this 
dissertation project provides a less-traversed tour of the history of globalization as it intersects 
with American public discourse, offering what Farrell calls an “inventional history” that “sets out 
to find out why and how the spoken and transmitted version of past experience comes to us the 
way it does.”437 It offers constitutive rhetoric as a perspective from which to stop and look at a 
historical moment that is taken for granted in most political and historical accounts that move 
quickly from one disaster and war to the next. It offers rhetoric scholars, in turn, a nuanced 
account of the historical relationships among public, popular, political, presidential, economic, 
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and institutional discourses that inform our thinking about current issues of domestic and global 
violence and inequality. It argues, basically, that our grandfathers tried to warn us.  
       Wendell Willkie feared “a corrosive cynicism that will destroy every chance of world 
order.”438 One World vividly countered such cynicism with optimistic and friendly portrayals of 
the people Willkie met in his whirlwind wartime trip around the world. I demonstrated in 
Chapter Two how Willkie’s ethos and compression of space and time served to create presence; 
rather than interpreting the world through the grim lens of an ongoing war, the book gave readers 
hope by describing commonalities and beholding rich diversities seen throughout the globe. It 
used rhetorical magnitude to make the world seem small, familiar, and economically accessible.  
Willkie’s status as a private citizen allowed him to be an outspoken critic of global 
imperialism and domestic racial injustice, seeing them as “completely antipathetic to all the 
principles for which we claim we fight.”439 His rhetoric of globalism was indeed principled, 
optimistic, and ultimately too forthright for him to realize his political aspirations. He sought to 
invent an inclusive version of non-partisan liberalism that responded seemingly intractable 
problems of injustice and inequity with economic fairness, generating a constitutive vision of a 
peaceful postwar world. “Somehow with a new approach and patient wisdom,” he wrote, “the 
question must be answered or a new leader will arise with a fierce fanaticism who will coalesce 
these discontents.”440 The unfortunate playing out of Willkie’s fears would occur time and again 
throughout the globe during the Cold War and into the twenty-first century, for economic 
discontent breeds resentment and disgust, and without a vocabulary for expression and redress, it 
leads to violence.  
That truth was also well understood by President Roosevelt, who approached the global 
war and Americans’ economic insecurities with his trademark rhetorical savvy. In Chapter 
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Three, I examined Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights as a constrained response to the public’s 
fears about the war and its aftermath that effectively positioned everyday Americans as 
stakeholders in the postwar economy. Building on his corpus of speeches throughout the 
presidency, Roosevelt scapegoated critics in order to unify the nation around a shared vision of 
economic security that would serve as a model for global human rights. By inscribing a “Second 
Bill of Rights” into the language of the nation’s founding, he reiterated the importance of the 
World War II era as epochal and liminal; the speech also marked a shifting mid-century 
liberalism within the Democratic party, establishing a social safety net while embracing the 
peacetime economic maxim that, as Stephen Holmes writes, “only a vigorous market economy, 
relying on individual incentives, can produce a surplus worth distributing by political means.”441 
 President Roosevelt’s influence in equating economic instability and poverty with war 
and fear of war, and in developing a lexicon for globalism as it intersected with the American 
postwar imagination, reverberated in the Congressional debates about the Bretton Woods 
agreements in the summer of 1945. One legislator cautioned, “The peoples over the earth are 
demanding a higher standard of living, freedom from want, freedom from fear of periodic 
semistarvation or of periodic unemployment. There will be turmoil and fear of war unless their 
demand is met.”442 The Congressional debates, examined in Chapter Four, serve as a third major 
landmark in the history of World War II-era globalism, a performative act in which in which a 
global economic infrastructure was institutionalized despite its inadequacies. That is, although 
the Bretton Woods monetary system of gold-backed U.S. dollars helped to regulate international 
currency values for the next twenty-five years, it could neither handle the global economy nor 
provide for the massive reconstruction efforts needed after the war. The Bretton Woods 
institutions, particularly the IMF, went on to sabotage in many cases the same global human 
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rights agenda for which the Economic Bill of Rights had prepared a framework—contributing, 
then, to a perpetual experience of economic turmoil, and to global and local acts of violence and 
war that stem from a noxious cycle of exploitation and inequality. 
 Nevertheless, in 1945, Congress was looking for a peaceful way forward. Supporters and 
opponents of the Bretton Woods agreements, like Roosevelt and Willkie, situated the moment 
within the nation’s history and drew on the language of the founding documents as well as 
economic arguments reminiscent of the early Republic. They also drew on various forms of 
expertise, which was sometimes technical and sometimes populist, and thus both characteristic of 
the era’s embrace of technocracy and at the same time demonstrative of a genuine democratic 
faith in the wisdom of the American people. While opponents of the Bretton Woods agreements 
held that Congress was acting too quickly and should delay voting, supporters wanted to act 
swiftly, using the example of the First Great War’s aftermath and recognizing that postwar 
international economic planning must be in place before the Second Great War’s imminent end.  
 “War is a force that gives us meaning,” Chris Hedges has written.443 Indeed, the theme of 
kairos—urgency, historical timing and timeliness, an awareness of the era as radically 
contingent, present, and meaningful—ran throughout the public, presidential, and legislative 
discourses about globalism analyzed in this dissertation. In the absence of a coherent postwar 
vision, a moment of liminality and kairos of the highest order, the nation turned to economics 
and to an American ethic of globalism to find meaning; economic rights were made into 
universal human rights, discursively placed outside of the logic of capitalism and outside of what 
economist Karl Polanyi termed the “market society.”  Polanyi feared that in the modern era, 
social relations had become embedded in the economy, rather than the reverse, and that the 
moral implications of this situation would be dire for future international and human affairs. His 
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effort was what economic sociologist Fred Block calls “a briefly glimpsed vision,” a moment in 
which “it appeared that market societies could be fundamentally reshaped by deeply democratic 
reforms.” 444 That moment has passed.  
 Globalism’s constitutive effects, however, still linger. The current experience of late 
market capitalism is a veritable speedway of kairotic moments, perpetual crises, and nonstop 
violence; if we are to access an alternative route, an ethical economics of globalization, then it 
would do us well to examine the rhetorical practices and material forces of our recent past. 
During the World War II era, the nation drew on its history to find argumentative topoi and 
rhetorical resources available for profoundly democratic deliberation across public, presidential, 
and institutional discourses; it contemplated a national ethos and global future of peace, justice 
and equality in a time of radical contingency. That, too, is what this project hopes to do.    
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